

DRAFT

**ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT, CHALLENGES AT THE MICRO LEVEL
AND IMPLICATIONS IN POST CONFLICT CYPRUS**

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Abstract

This paper analyses part of a pioneering research survey carried out in both Cypriot communities dealing, among other issues, with the root causes of the conflict, the political culture, social attitudes and future solutions. This was not an easy task in a deeply divided society. I will first address the question of what it means to do research in a deeply divided society and how this effort was confronted with the macro conflict dynamics. Then I will focus on the analysis of the causes of the conflict within the conflict theories perspective. The findings show that both internal and external factors have contributed to the perpetuation of the problem in Cyprus, a view that challenges the selective official positions that define the problem as either a problem of external factors or merely an internal discord between the majority and minority population; I propose a “linkage approach” to conflict analysis and resolution. Some generalizations will be made with regard to the value of micro level research in the field of conflict resolution and the need for an institutionalised peace mentality at both micro-and- macro level politics in the pre-and-post-conflict period in Cyprus.

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ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT, CHALLENGES AT THE MICRO LEVEL AND IMPLICATIONS IN POST CONFLICT CYPRUS

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Doing research in a divided country

As an academic, an activist, a citizen and a woman living for decades in a divided society I always wanted to know through joint research the other's side of the story and their experience of the conflict. Though I tried numerous times the politics on the ground made it thus impossible. The opportunity came in 1999 when a non-governmental organization, the Peace Center, of which I am the president, submitted a proposal on "the study of bicomunal perceptions, belief systems and future solutions in Cyprus" to the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The project was accepted and funded, and the survey finished in September 2002. The process itself was not easy.¹

Due to the bicomunal focus I had to find a research centre in the Turkish Cypriot community to first believe in the value of such a project and second to commit to participate in its various phases. Having being involved for over twenty-years in bicomunal meetings and conflict resolution workshops held in the "dead zone", mainly at the Ledra Palace hotel I was able to identify interested Turkish Cypriots. At the time of the research proposal permissions were not granted to the Turkish Cypriot participants due to political arbitrary decisions taken by the leadership in the North, thus they could not cross to the buffer zone in Nicosia. We chose, instead, to meet in Pyla village which is near to one of the British military sovereign bases. Pyla is the only mixed village lying inside the Green Line and has been under the supervision of the UN peacekeeping forces since 1974. This village became to many in the bicomunal peace work the symbolic space of the desire for co-existence.

At the initial phase we brainstormed on the themes and the questions we wanted to raise in the research. The Turkish Cypriots did not want their names to be on the project proposal but for us to simply mention "in collaboration with Turkish Cypriot researchers", with no individual and no professional titles! I often felt as if we were doing something illegal because we had to be so cautious and self-censoring for fear not to leak out that a Turkish Cypriot Centre in the North was working together with a

Greek Cypriot NGO in the South. The major political issue involved here was that of (non)recognition. We sometimes felt in the Pyla coffee-shops we were meeting that secret police dressed in civilian clothes watched us.

On the Greek Cypriot side we could not use Turkish Cypriot academics' names and affiliation since the universities in the North are considered "pseudo universities" in an unrecognised state. So how to overcome this obstacle when the funding organization needed names and affiliation! We had to make the funders understand the political constraints and sensitivities'. We felt that if they really wanted to see the actualisation of the project they had to overlook some of their regulations. In the end, we showed understanding to each other's realities and all three parties believed that the project was important enough to overlook some rules.

The follow-up was not so difficult since with the use of technology, messages were sent back and forth for two years. Difficulties arose in keeping the deadlines and sending the statistical data from the north to the south. Due to different concerns and priorities it could take many weeks before an answer to a deadline would be met. Since this was not a normal framework of collaborative research we often experienced frustration, fears, issues of trust, impatience and despair. The lack of face-to-face contact can explain the one year's time difference in implementing and finishing the research in the north compared to the south. There were instances when we were about to give up but thanks to the funders' understanding we were able to complete it. Upon completion we were told that it was one of the most successful projects UNOPS had funded.

The other significant problem we faced was the distribution of the money to the Turkish Cypriot colleagues. They made it clear they did not want to "get the money from a Greek Cypriot hand". I had suggested meeting in the village of Pyla and provide a cash payment. Their fear was, "what if the authorities have a spy around and watch what we do, we will get into serious trouble". They could not start the project unless they had the money. Another strategy we implemented was to ask a Turkish Cypriot whose wife had an account in a British Bank to send the money via a Cyprus bank from the South to a Bank in England, exchange it into Sterling pounds and transfer the money to the north and then exchange it into Turkish liras. In this way our collaborators would avoid been called "traitors" since they received the money "from a Turkish Cypriot hand"! In the end , we came to learn why producing

knowledge from both sides of the divide is so significant and can be so threatening to the other. We believe the process was as important as the product.

In this paper I will analyse part of the findings of the this work, first research survey done since 1974, comprising both Cypriot communities. It was a long detailed survey dealing with a number of issues. It constitutes a breakthrough in that it addresses concerns, fears, belief systems and needs at the micro level and has produced data which can be used by the macro level and third parties dealing with the solution and the post conflict situation A number of challenges emerge with political and social implications for the macro level. For instance, studying the root causes of the Cyprus conflict both governmental and non-governmental organizations can gain more insights into the changing realities on the ground and design processes for socialization toward the resolution of the conflict. Third parties can become more informed and thus sensitive to the domestic needs and concerns.

The paper is framed as follows: A theoretical framework using conflict theories to first locate the importance of the research on the cause of the conflict. Some information about the survey and the political background will then be given. Then the analysis of the root causes that contribute to the perpetuation of the conflict will be presented. In the end the implications of doing research at the micro level in post conflict situations will be discussed with some concluding remarks.

Scientific data in protracted and deep-rooted conflicts, as has been the Cyprus case, is constantly needed so as to bring a closer understanding between the macro and micro levels so that the resolution would be representative of both levels' interests and needs. Thus I propose a "Linkage" approach.

Intractable Conflicts and Belief Systems

Major conflict theories

In the conflict literature we can identify two broad schools of thought regarding the nature and roots of conflict. One views social conflict as something "rational, constructive, socially functional" (Simmel, 1955, Coser 1968, Gurr, 1969) and the other views it as something "irrational, pathological and socially dysfunctional" (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraft, 1981). Three major theoretical approaches emerge from each school of thought. The first is what is called the "classical", the second the "behaviourist" and the third what I call the "Linkage". The first takes as its units of

analysis the macro level (nation, institutions, ethnic, class, etc), the other takes the micro level, i.e the individual as its unit of analysis and both the conscious and the unconscious are examined in order to understand hidden motivational factors. The Linkage views social conflict as an interactive process and as a result of a variety of subsystems and factors and thus use an inter-disciplinary approach. Both macro and micro levels as well as rational and irrational processes constitute the level of analysis thus the relationship of the individual to the nation-state is considered. This is the approach I would employ in order to understand the complexity of ethno-national conflicts, like the Cyprus one (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1987).

There are different micro theories of conflict as there are multiple macro theories of conflict. I will only highlight the ones most relevant to this case study. The old “nature vs. nurture” debate still goes on with the first placing emphasis on the innate predisposition of humans toward aggression and many psychologists point to Freud’s “death instinct” theory and social Darwinism. The second view maintains that there is no scientific basis for considering human beings innately aggressive animals, inevitably committed to war on the basis of biological nature. “Rather, war is a result of socialization and conditioning, a phenomenon of human organization, planning and information processing that plays on emotional and motivational potentialities.” In short, the Seville Statement implies that we have real choices and that a new kind of responsibility in the conduct of human group life is possible (Mack, 1990, p.58) For instance, in Cyprus, the whole process of socialization post 1974 in the formal and informal education system the national narrative of “I Do not Forget and I Struggle” has been for decades promoting in the minds of young generations in both sides of the divide the “*egoism of victimization*” that is, the “incapacity of an ethno-national group, as a direct result of its own historical traumas, to empathize with the suffering of another group.” (Mack,1990). Specific radio programs with the same message “Don’t Forget” as well as TV programs socialized the public into the conflict culture. Stressing one’s own pain and suffering leads to demonization and de-humanization of the other. The result has been the deepening of victimhood and distancing from the other’s perspective and (his/her)story.

Connected to such behaviors and strategies are the Social Learning and Conflict Identity theories. The first reinforces the “nurture” argument by pointing out that aggression and racism are learned at home, the school, and more generally in the interaction with the environment. The second theory (Tajfel, 1981) is based on normal

psychological processes in the course of developing our social identities whereby we affiliate with our own group (family, ethnicity, community, nation) and this reinforces our human need for self esteem, self worth which we receive from belonging to our group. The concepts of *ingroup* and *outgroup* are important here in that we compare ourselves, our group, our community to other groups who we perceive as “inferior”. In times of conflict we tend to demonize the other and thus try to project on to them all the “badness” of ourselves which we tend to deny or consciously ignore (Hadjipavlou, 2002, 2004).

Inter-group relations have been part of the problem in Cyprus, as in many other ethnno-national problems, whereby ethnic affiliations are powerful, permeative, passionate and pervasive, (Horowitz 1985). At the core we have the relations between the majority, the Greek Cypriots (80%) and the minority (18%) of Turkish Cypriots who especially after 1963 felt dominated and perceived as “inferior” by the majority. In the post 1974 period the influx of Turkish settlers developed a new inter-group tension between the Turkish Cypriots and Turks. A different Other has been created.

The concepts of (il)legitimacy and (non)recognition are important in the case of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots do not recognize the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus as representing them and the Greek Cypriots speak of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a “pseudo state and an illegal one” and refer to the UN Security Council resolution 541 which declares the action “legally invalid” and calls on all states not to recognize the new entity. Increased mistrust and competing goals consolidated further the conflict environment.

The Macro theories of conflict focus on the interactions of groups especially at the conscious level and the objective dynamics and conditions that are involved.. Some focus on the historical evolution of conflict such as C. Marx, R. Dahrendorf and more recently J. Galtung. Marx sees conflict as a product of the capitalist social and economic structure. Dahrendorf sees authority and not class as the prime source of conflict. Another major concept here is the use of *power* which manifests itself in economic, political, military, and cultural realms of life. Thus emphasis is given on competition over scarce resources (such as territory, power, status, etc).

Decision making and Game theories developed based on the “rational actor model” whereby people make choices and decisions on a rational basis relying on informed choices and weighing of opportunities. Negotiation, communication and information are important here (Schelling, 1960). In Cyprus the “rational actor model” although

often used (most recently in the Annan Plan) has failed in the Greek Cypriot community for as Horowitz explains “ethnicity finds its way into a myriad of issues: development plans, educational controversies, trade union affairs, land policy, business policy, tax policy. Characteristically, issues that would elsewhere be relegated to the category of routine administration assume a central place on the political agenda of ethnically divided societies” (Horowitz, 1985, p.8) This has been true prior (the London-Zurich agreements 1959) and during the bloody intercommunal strife in 1963 and in 1967 when the Turkish Cypriots experienced political and economic isolation, the impact of which still prevails, adding to the complexity of the conflict. Historical grievances are matched by the perceived illegitimacy of the state and the demand by the “minority group” for sovereign autonomy, something that was tried unilaterally in the north of Cyprus in 1983.

One of the principles of the multi-disciplinary field of Conflict Resolution is that the examination and analysis of the root causes of an inter-ethnic and international conflict are of paramount importance if we are to make effective interventions in the direction of peacebuilding, conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction. Usually, the interplay between domestic and external factors create and perpetuate the conflict. In deeply divided societies experiencing protracted conflicts which last for generations and where barbed wires and police checkpoints prohibit freedom of movement of both ideas and goods the ideal environment is set for reinforcement of conflict, mistrust and suspicion as well as the flourishing of the “enemy images” Both the Enemy System Theory (Volkan 1988, Montville, 1990, Mack, 1990) and the Human Needs Theory (Burton 1990, Kelman, 1990) apply to the case of Cyprus. Both theories try to explain the complexity of group behavior especially antagonistic group relationships. “The gist of the Enemy System Theory is the hypothesis that humans have a deep rooted psychological need to dichotomise and to establish *enemies* and *allies*. This phenomenon happens on individual and group levels . This is an unconscious need which feeds conscious relationships, especially in our group lives” (Cunningham, 1998). This view is close to the Social Identity Theory, mentioned above, as well as to international relations theory in which wars which are logistically planned can be connected to human’s primitive and unconscious impulses which when mobilized result in the phenomena where former neighbours harm and kill each other simply because they belong to different national groups (i.e. the Kontemenos (1964) and Tochni villages massacre (1974) in Cyprus). Locating the source of hatred or

antagonism usually leads us to some historical animosity. In the case of Cyprus some trace this animosity to the 1950s with the rise of two antagonistic, imported nationalisms, others to 1821 Greek revolution against the Ottoman Empire and still others trace it back to the fall of Constantinople. The “historic enmity” argument is often used by the proponents of “essentialism” to justify reconciliation steps they do not take because the enemy remains unchanged throughout the ages..

In ethno-national and inter-national conflict the interplay between internal (issues of competing nationalisms, majority-minority, uneven economic development, the role of institutions, social psychological factors, etc.) and external dynamics (colonialism, manipulation by external stakeholders, geopolitics, “motherlands” role, etc) has proven to be crucial in the history of politics in Cyprus to this day. These factors as experienced in intractable conflicts, or protracted (Azar, 1985, 1990) or deep-rooted (Burton 1987; Mitchell, 1981) together with the social –psychological ones such as misperceptions, prejudice, stereotypes, belief systems, memories, historical grievances, mirror images, traumas, and the “us” and “them” dichotomy which feed the macro external factors need to be taken into account and be analysed. Such a holistic analysis will provide us with a deeper understanding of conflict intractability and point to appropriate interventions .

In times of conflict and outside threat to a groups’ basic human needs- security, recognition, dignity, justice- processes both internal and external are mobilized by governing elites. The one group usually ascribes to members of the other group homogeneous traits, intensions, and other characteristics, i.e. stereotypes, in an effort to show how their own side is moderate and reconciliatory and is internally cohesive

The Cyprus conflict has been on the international agenda and different fora since 1963 when the UN Peace Keeping forces arrived on the island and the green Line was drawn. According to the ten criteria set out by Azar (1990) and Kriesburg (1995) on what constitutes intractable conflicts the Cyprus case fits all of them These include existential fears, un-addressed historical grievances, economic asymmetries, a culture of separation and miscommunication, outside interferences and the frustration of collective basic human needs. These are, indeed, the different factors this research reveals (Hadjipavlou 2004b). A culture of conflict becomes demanding, stressful and very costly for both parties in different ways. According to Bar Tal (1998):

They (intractable conflicts) require that society members adapt to the conflictual situations both in their individual and social life. Successful societal adaptation to and

coping with intractable demands certain appropriate military, economic, political, societal, and psychological conditions... These beliefs, on the one hand strengthen the society to help it cope with the conflict as such, but on the other hand, they also constitute its continuation.” (p.23).

Thus, the state and its institutions (media, the church, education, family, etc) in order to fulfil those conditions, pass on to its members particular societal beliefs and information (or misinformation) about causes of the conflict often in a selective manner. National historiography plays up the ‘enemy image’ theory. Bar-Tal has shown the attempts of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in view of their protracted conflict to delegitimize each other through various societal channels, Specifically, he described examples from political leaders’ speeches, documents and newspapers commentaries, analysis of literature and school books which were all transmitting information portraying the other group in an extremely negative way. The same attitudes and selective presentation of the Other we find in Cyprus (Spyrou 2001, 2002, Koullapis 2002, Yashin, 2002, Hadjipavlou, 2004b). The Cyprus experience and the process of early socialization is filled with “chosen traumas and chosen glories” whereby the heroes of one side are the traitors of the other (Volkan.1978). In such an environment grieving and mourning become politically exploited as well as instrumentalized and people cannot face giving up what has been lost thus the perpetuation of the conflict.

Let us now look at some general information regarding the research survey

The Survey

As I mentioned in the introduction the Greek Cypriot part of the survey was conducted in the summer of 2000, in the Republic of Cyprus (in the south) and was based on a sample of 1073 people, aged 18+, stratified according to district, age, and gender in proportion to the size of the population for each of these classifications. This sample size gives us a confidence interval of 95% and a sampling error of +/- 3, based on the population census of 1992. For the Turkish Cypriots, (in the north) the sample was 1048, with the same confidence interval and the same sampling error. The survey was conducted by personal interviews, using a universal ‘closed questionnaire’ (standard fifty questions answered by all) as well as a selective ‘open questionnaire’ (with analytical questions answered by one out of every ten people).Over sixty university students were trained as interviewers in both communities and had the opportunity to work together.

The Major Objectives

The aim of the survey was to explore the political and national perceptions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with regards to their own communities, their past and future, as well as their perceptions with regards to each other and the causes of the conflict. Furthermore, the survey wished to record the political beliefs and attitudes of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in correlation with other socio-economic characteristics, in an attempt to draw sociological profiles/categories of Cypriot society and its different subgroups.

The empirical data helps build a deeper and more exact landscape of the Cypriot society, thus enriching the social dialogue regarding rapprochement and relations between the two communities, as well as form a sociological backbone to any proposed solution of the Cyprus problem and the peacebuilding processes. People's feelings and positions regarding the Cyprus problem, as well as their relations with the other community, could very well form a crucial indicator for the sustainability of any future solution to the country's de facto division.

Political Background

On the Greek Cypriot side the survey (Summer 2000) was conducted almost a year before the May 2001 Greek Cypriot parliamentary elections, and two years after the last presidential elections of February 1998. The official peace talks were at a standstill. The Right managed to secure victory (and government) through the re-election of ex-president of the Democratic Rally (DI.SI) Glafkos Clerides whereas the left, and in particular AKEL, managed to win the majority of the parliamentary seats in the elections of May 2001 (20 as opposed to 19 won by the Democratic Rally) and the presidency of the House in the person of its general secretary, Mr. Demetris Christofias. The survey took place before this period of "cohabitation" (Right Presidency of government, Left Presidency of the House of Parliament) but at a time when the electoral forces of the Right and the Left seemed to be at a close balance.

On the Turkish Cypriot side the last parliamentary election took place in June 1998 and the "presidential" election in 2002 which was won again by Rauf Denktash. It was thus conducted before the submission of the UN Secretary General's peace and reconciliation Plan, "Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 2002" (also known as the Annan Plan). The lack of communication and direct personal contacts prevailed at the time. The partial opening of the Green Line in April 2003 created a different dynamic at the grass roots.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was divided into four parts reflecting the data categories we wanted to explore, and which we believed could provide the basis for the socio-political study of Cypriot society. The variables were coded E1-E50 and the four parts comprised the following:

1. Demographic information
2. Religion-Church/Mosque
3. Class and political consciousness-roots of the conflict
4. National (ethnic) consciousness-the self and other

This paper will only concentrate on the presentation and analysis of findings from the third part, that is referring to the causes that contribute to the perpetuation of the conflict.

Root Causes of the Cyprus Conflict

In our effort to locate the understanding and beliefs of the two communities regarding the deep causes of the Cyprus conflict we provided our interviewees with a general list of the most frequently cited causes in the literature on the study of the Cyprus case. The list has been based on both external and internal factors, that is, we tried to highlight the interaction between macro (historical, economic and institutional factors) and micro level (social-psychological, societal) factors.

Q.E43 To what extent have the following issues influenced the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem ?

43.1 the 'divide and rule' policy of the British

43.2 the nationalism of the Turkish/Greek Cypriots

43.3 the nationalism of both communities

43.4 the role of the Orthodox Church

43.5 The Zurich constitution

43.6 Turkish/Greek expansionism

43.7 The interests and intervention of foreign states

43.8 the national (ethnic)-religious-cultural differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

43.9 The social and economic inequality between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

43.10 The errors committed at one time or another by our leadership

43.11 The intransigence of the other side

43.12 The involvement of Greece/Turkey

43.13 The retreatism on our side

43.14 The lack of communication between the two communities

43.15 The lack of trust between the two communities

43.16 The different values and perceptions/beliefs cultivated by the educational systems of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots

43.17 The use of national symbols (i.e. the flag or the national anthem) by each community

Table 1 Greek Cypriots





Table 2. Turkish-Cypriots



We can measure this question with the mean average as shown above as well as in the detailed percentage method which I will follow here to examine the degree in which different factors have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. The question utilizes the most frequently voiced causes of the Cyprus problem, those that have historically been used as individual and/or combined

explanations for the situation in Cyprus, and the roots of today’s conflict. Although the majority of these explanations are those that have historically been voiced as causal factors primarily by the Greek Cypriots, some are shared by the Turkish Cypriots too (as explanations to the problem).

In order to best illustrate the details of this question (which the table on mean averages does not show) an analytical explanation of the percentages noted for each part of this question is given below.

British Policy of “Divide and Rule”

Table 3

<u>The "divide and rule" policy of the British has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	849	79.2	490	47,0
Somewhat	124	11.6	229	22,0
Not very	22	2.1	73	7,0
Not at all	15	1.4	59	5,7
DK	62	5.8	192	18.4

This factor is often cited by the Greek Cypriots as the most important in the discord and separation of the two communities and this is confirmed by the 90.6% of Greek Cypriots interviewees who believe that the “Divide and Rule” policy of British colonialists in Cyprus contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem as against a much lower total of 69.0% of Turkish Cypriots who seem to believe the same thing. It is interesting to note that the different percentages of Greek and Turkish Cypriots who support this may relate to the different historical relations the two communities have had with the colonial power. While the Greek Cypriots opposed British rule for decades (and ended up fighting against the British), for Enosis (union) with “motherland” Greece, the Turkish Cypriots formed the local backbone of continued British rule on the island as auxiliary police force or in administrative positions. As a reaction to “Enosis” of the Greek Cypriots they demanded “taxim” (partition) or return of the island to Turkey. One may also say that de-colonization has not really been completed in Cyprus due to the presence of two sovereign bases comprising 99 square miles of Cyprus territory. The bases form a point of contention

especially among the Greek Cypriot left and ecologists who demand their withdrawal. In a way, for the Greek Cypriots colonialism is still present.

It was during the British period that antagonistic nationalisms arose with competing visions and influence from mainland Turkey and Greece. The experience of the Greek Cypriots was that the colonialists used Turkish Cypriots to fight the Greek nationalists, members of E.O.K.A. (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). Furthermore, the British policy complicated bicomunal relations by bringing in Turkey as a stakeholder in the future of the island. In 1955 British Prime Minister Anthony Eden said, “I regard our alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in our policy in that part of the world” (Stephens, 1966, Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1987). The Greek Cypriots do not easily forgive the British for their policy of double standard.

Nationalism

Table 4

<u>E43. The nationalism of the Turkish / Greek Cypriots has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	679	63.5	600	57,6
Somewhat	246	23.0	264	25,4
Not very	61	5.7	45	4,3
Not at all	28	2.6	40	3,8
DK	56	5.2	92	8,8
<i>Total</i>	<i>1070</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1041</i>	<i>100,0</i>

This question looks at the issue of nationalism on each side separate whereas the one below refers to the “nationalism of both communities”. A significantly high percentage of Greek Cypriots (86.5%) believe that the nationalism of the Turkish Cypriots has contributed to the Cyprus problem. An almost identical percentage (83%) of Turkish Cypriots also believe that the nationalism of the Greek Cypriots has contributed to the Cyprus problem. These combined percentages for Greek and Turkish Cypriots are significantly high, and they portray two crucial causal factors (as both communities seem to believe) of the Cyprus problem. This is part of what is called

“mirror image” The question below is closely related to this one and will be analyzed in combination

Table 5

<u>E43. The nationalism of both communities has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	G/Cypriots		T/Cypriots	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	555	51.8	488	47,0
Somewhat	330	30.8	360	34,6
Not very	111	10.4	71	6,8
Not at all	28	2.6	33	3,2
DK	48	4.5	87	8,4
Total	1072	100.0	1039	100,0

A cumulative percent of 82.6% of Greek Cypriots believes that the nationalism of *both* communities was very, or somewhat responsible for the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. Again, a similar percentage (81.6%) of Turkish Cypriots share this exact same opinion. The undertaking of mutual responsibility, acknowledgement of each other’s contribution to the creation of the conflict as well as an indication of political maturity are hopeful signs. Does this also indicate a realization of the anachronism of nationalism as a mechanism for achieving one’s one political goals? Does findings also point toward recognition of past mistakes, perhaps willingness to avoid repetition, and an ability to move ahead in disregard of official narratives?

Historically, the rise of Greek Cypriot ethnic nationalism preceded almost by a century that of the Turkish Cypriot (for detailed analysis see: Salih, 1968, Kitromilidis 1978, Papadakis 1993, 1998, Mavratsas 1998, Kilziculturek 2000, and Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1987, Bryant, 2002, etc.). By the late 1940s the ethnic origin of each group, the reinforcement of cultural and national identity in each community through separate education and close connections to “motherlands” led to mutual distancing and emphasis was put on their Greekness or Turkishness with no space left for legitimating Cypriotism. The role of the British in politicizing religious differences and thus leading to the estrangement of the relations between the two communities is stressed by different scholars. For instance, Poliis (1976:53) informs us:

The British took apolitical religious differences in Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicized them and transformed them into

nationality groups. The generally shared culture and values were ignored, as were the common bonds among members of the same socio-economic strata, irrespective of religion. By adopting a particular set of educational and political policies, differences were exacerbated and redefined while commonalities were relegated to insignificance.

Thus gradually two distinct ethnic cultures emerge with competing ideologies. Both the local elites and the Church in the Greek Cypriot community in collaboration and encouragement from “motherlands” led to the emergence of a culture of intolerance and mistrust. The compromised agreement among the external stakeholders in 1959 ignored the societal dynamics. The “reluctant republic” (Xydis, 1973) was born in very shaky minds and hearts. Nationalism, however, continued to function in each community in the post-independence period leading to the “fall of the Republic” in 1963 (Salih 1968, Kyriakides, 1968, Markides, 1977) and the subsequent coup d’etat in 1974 and the Turkish invasions which partitioned the island into North and South.

It is therefore hopeful that the interviewees in our survey overwhelmingly acknowledge that the nationalism of both sides constitute one of the root causes of the Cyprus conflict. This mutual acknowledgement can open up space for public dialogue on a joint future and the development of a shared overarching identity that of Cypriot and toady of a European identity as well. For this to happen all the institutions need to be participating, especially the institution of the Church in the Greek Cypriot community and of course education in both communities.

The Role of the Church

Table 6

<u>E43. The role of the Orthodox church has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	240	22.4	565	54,4
Somewhat	219	20.5	186	17,9
Not very	210	19.6	45	4,3
Not at all	355	33.2	48	4,6
DK	46	4.3	194	18,7
Total	<i>1070</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1038</i>	<i>100,0</i>

In this question we observe a total of 52.8% of Greek Cypriots believe that the Orthodox Church had very little or nothing to do with the creation/perpetuation of the

Cyprus problem whereas a cumulative 43% believe that it did.. On the contrary, 72.3% of Turkish Cypriots believe that the Orthodox Church played a role in the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. While Greek Cypriot nationalism is blamed by the Greek Cypriots themselves in the previous assessment the Cyprus problem by (more than 82%) in this question the role of the Church in defending and upholding nationalism is not recognized as much as a causal factor for the problem.

On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots seem to overemphasize the role of the Church as a factor in the Cyprus problem, obviously because the Greek Cypriot Church had historically been the 'demon' of Turkish Cypriot cultural and political collective fears. It was the Church in 1950 which organized a plebiscite which showed that 96% of those who voted favored union with Greece. The Turkish Cypriot minority protested against the plebiscite, as did the Turkish government, and brought world attention to the Church's scheme for enosis (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1987) The fact that the political leader of the anticolonial struggle in 1955 was Archbishop Makarios III, who was a fervent supporter of Enosis, was an act that instigated the violent reaction of the Turkish Cypriots. The archbishop signed the Zurich-London agreements (Markides, 1977) with Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. F. Kutchuk and later became the first president of the Republic. All this did not fare well with the Turkish Cypriots and the old mistrust, historic hatreds were not alleviated and no reconciliation processes instituted.

In the post-independence period the Church continued to speak about Enosis and openly showed its discontent about the constitutional arrangements. The Church continued to have influence on issues of education, social values and norms in the Greek Cypriot community. No minister of education was appointed unless he or she had the blessing of the Church since the Church saw it its role to safeguard the Hellenism and Orthodoxy and the national identity of the Greeks on the island thus showing no respect for the fact that the island was an independent state of a bicomunal and inter-ethnic character.

In the post 1974 events the leaders of the Church (archbishop and bishops) often appealed to their congregation to "take up arms against the infidels and the Turkish occupiers of the holy lands of our ancestors." Thus we have the phenomenon where the Church, instead of preaching reconciliation and peaceful co-existence, was consolidating the fears, mistrust and separation of the two communities. In view of all these conditions the fact that more than forty percent consider the Church as

contributing to the roots of the conflict tells us that social critique of this institution and its role in the Greek Cypriot community has begun pointing to the desire to keep the Church out of politics, especially concerning its negative impact on the relations of the two communities and the conflict as well as lack of empathy for the Turkish Cypriot suffering during the 63-74 decade. Recently, the Turkish Cypriots started differentiating that not all the Church bishops believe the same. An example has been the bishop of Morphou who in public statements and in press interviews published in Turkish Cypriot newspapers as well denounced nationalism and stated he was prepared to go and live in Morphou, his city in the North and supported the Annan Plan (Selides, 2004).

The Cyprus Constitution

Table 7

	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
<u>E43. The Zurich constitution has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>				
Very	527	49.3	121	11.7
Somewhat	259	24.2	231	22.3
Not very	98	9.2	143	13.8
Not at all	39	3.6	147	14.2
DK	146	13.7	395	38.1
Total	<i>1069</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1037</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Although a significant number of Greek Cypriots (73.5%) think that the Zurich constitution has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem (one would think until 1974 when the constitution was rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and their choice for a separate political existence prevailed) this number is not as high as perhaps expected. This finding is surprising and noteworthy exactly because in all mainstream Greek Cypriot (and others) analyses of the Cyprus problem, the Zurich constitution is almost always mentioned as a crucial cause for the malfunction and slow collapse of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus. Conversely, only 34.0% of Turkish Cypriots believe that the Zurich constitution led to what became later the Cyprus problem. This is an indicative example of the gap that exists between the two communities, with regard to understanding and interpreting certain events in the recent

history, and especially the historical moments of conflict including December 1963-1964 and 1967 events. A significant 38.1% of Turkish Cypriots replied that it 'does not know or does not answer' to this question, while 13.7% of Greek Cypriots also stated that.

The answers to this question also reflect the corresponding different interpretations of Cyprus' independence and its constitution. The Greek Cypriots viewed it both as an imposed and divisive constitution. The people of Cyprus were not asked to participate or voice their opinion before the adoption.² It is well-known that the Greek Cypriots viewed the constitutional provisions with regard to power-sharing as unfair and undemocratic in that the minority was accorded disproportionate rights and power to its numerical representation. That is the allocation of 70 % for the Greek Cypriots and 30% for the Turkish Cypriots of all government positions was viewed as a violation of the majority principle. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots although comprising only the 18% of the total population would occupy 30% of the seats in the Parliament. Elections were held separate in each community. The police force as well as the 2,000-man army would be 40% Turkish Cypriot and 60% Greek Cypriot. The vice-president was a Turkish Cypriot and the President a Greek Cypriot each elected separately. Separate were also the education systems and curriculum. Both the vice-president and the president had the power to veto legislation a right used in abundance due to mistrust. With all these divisive elements, the absence of good will from both communities to make it work soon difficulties arose over basic taxation issues, the establishment of separate municipalities (something the Greek Cypriots felt it was close to partition) and over the insistence of the Turkish Cypriots that the police and the army should be ethnically separate brought the government machinery to a standstill (Kyriakides, 1968, Markides 1977 and Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1987)

Underneath this standstill lay the Turkish Cypriot suspicions and fears that the Greek Cypriots had never given up the enosis demand, in turn the Greek Cypriots did not believe that the Turkish Cypriots had given up partition. Thus when Makarios on November 30, 1963 put forward his 13-points for amending the constitution with the expressed motivation to make it functional and the implementation of certain provisions less costly he received the outright rejection from the Turkish government and then from the Turkish Cypriot vice-president who declared the "constitution dead". Soon after the "Bloody Christmas" as it is referred to by the Turkish Cypriots, inter-ethnic fighting spread from Nicosia to all other towns Political chaos ensued and in

1964 Turkey threatened to invade in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriot nationalists and extremists. The state had proven inadequate to do so.

It is thus not surprising that the Turkish Cypriot interviewees in our survey do not consider the Constitution to have been one of the root causes of the conflict and instead blame the Greek Cypriots for the “fall of the Cyprus Republic” The fact that almost forty percent replied that they did not know can be interpreted as either they are skeptical about this factor or not well-informed regarding the recent history. This needs to be investigated further.³

The “Motherlands”: Greece and Turkey

Table 8

<u>E43.6 Turkey’s/Greece's expansionism has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	950	88.7	494	47,6
Somewhat	82	7.7	280	27,0
Not very	10	.0	76	7,3
Not at all	12	1.1	54	5,2
DK	17	1.6	133	12,8
<i>Total</i>	<i>1071</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1037</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Table 9

<u>E43.12 The involvement of Greece/ Turkey has contributed in the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	407	38.0	239	23,1
Somewhat	264	24.6	286	27,6
Not very	204	19.0	99	9,6
Not at all	156	14.6	303	29,2
DK	40	3.7	106	10,5
<i>Total</i>	<i>1071</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1036</i>	<i>100,0</i>

The relationship of the two communities to their respective “motherlands” has historically been different both prior to independence and in the post independence period as well as in the post 1974. There is a need for an in-depth study of this relationship across time. This relationship touches upon issues of identity, security and national interests as well as “historic enmity”. Clifford Geertz concept of “primordial attachments” as the natural force, some would say spiritual force, that binds an ethnic group’s sense of self together applies to the two Cypriot communities. Geertz (1963:109-130) defines ‘primordial attachments’ as the givens of special existence, that is the “givens that stem from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, seem to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves”. The strength of this “corporate feeling of oneness” is not so much the result of practical necessity, obligation or common interest as it is of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The Greek Cypriots learned that the island was and “will always be Greek” and the Turkish Cypriots that the island is Turkish and should go back to Turkey. Thus each ethnic group showed more loyalty to their respective “motherlands” than to the state of Cyprus and its flag. This narrative still featured in the official discourses in post 1974 period.

Thus question.43.6 together with 43.12 refer to the perceptions and relationships of the two “motherlands” or “national centers”, Greece and Turkey to each Cypriot community. These two parts of the question will be discussed together. It is not surprising that a total of 96.4% of Greek Cypriots believe that Turkish expansionism was either ‘very, or somewhat’ responsible for the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. This is an expected numerical result which is based on the previous attempts of Turkey (1964 and 1967) to unsuccessfully invade the island, succeeding in July 1974 with the subsequent occupation of 37% of Cyprus territory and the continuing presence of nearly 40,000 Turkish troops. The displacement of nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots and the loss of loved ones and the subsequent economic catastrophe are all blamed on Turkey. The Greek Cypriot biggest insecurity is the Turkish army. Thus Turkey presents both the practical embodiment of the phrase ‘the Cyprus problem’ as well as the strongest indication of Turkish expansionism on Cyprus. Greek Cypriots often mention Turkish claims in the Aegean.⁴

On the other hand, a considerable percentage of 62.6 of Greek Cypriots supports the statement that the involvement of Greece has contributed in some ways to the Cyprus Problem. This percentage seems quite surprising, considering the high levels of attachment to Greece expressed in another question E39.6 of our survey which was (77.6% 'very or somewhat attached'). This can be understood in a number of ways: first with reference to the rise of junta in Greece (1967-74), second the junta's expressed support for the underground terrorist organization EOKA B' and third in collaboration with the Greek junta staged the July 15, 1974 coup against the government of President Makarios. This gave the 'excuse' to Turkey to invade to allegedly "restore constitutional order" according to her Guarantor status. The junta fell but "Cyprus was sacrificed". Democratic Greece did not respond to Greek Cypriots' expectations on August 24, 1974 during the second Turkish invasion and they felt betrayed.

Some people advocated political disengagement from Greece and supported loyalty to the Cypriot state and started opening up rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots and building bridges of reconciliation and mutual understanding (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1998). The emphasis on the Cypriot part of identity taking as reference Cyprus, the state, as the 'motherland' grew in the later years when the accession to the European Union became a new political reality.

Amongst the Turkish Cypriot interviewees 74.6% believe, on the other hand, that Greece's expansionism contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriots have in mind the efforts made by both Greece and the Greek Cypriots to have the island unite with Greece in the 1950s. This goal continued by some groups in the post-independence period. However, as expected a lower percentage of 50.7 holds Turkey responsible for the Cyprus problem. This is understandable, in a historical context, given the view that the 1974 Turkish intervention was experienced at first as a peace operation, to liberate Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriot domination and fear of "being eliminated" Having in mind the brainwashing carried out in the community for decades that "Turkey is our savior and rescuer" this percentage can be considered as is high enough. It can today be taken as a criticism against the Turkish intentions. It can also refer to the rising critical voices among Turkish Cypriots who see the Turkish military as an outright oppressor of Turkish Cypriots' rights and freedoms. Furthermore, given the experience with mainland Turkish settlers in the north, it is understandable why many would think

Turkey’s involvement as that of an imposer (given its own geo-strategic interests) rather than that of a liberator.

The findings to these questions indicate that the unconditional loyalty and support to “motherlands” has been questioned and the issue of “primordial attachments” at least at the political and somewhat cultural identification is today being challenged. There is more possibility for opening up spaces for alternative and more complex or pragmatic relationships with “motherlands” to develop. Cyprus’ accession to the European Union (as a reunited island, a hope expressed by many Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who had worked to this end for decades). This possibility would also allow a re-thinking of the distinct “Cypriotness” within the European as a third space in which neither Greekness nor Turkishness will be threatened. This would produce an acknowledgment of the fluid nature of identities as well as their de-politicization.

Foreign Interests and Interventions

This question is related to the previous one in the level of exogenous factors as a cause of the Cyprus conflict. Both communities stress in their narrative the role of outside powers and in their mental map there feature always Britain, the United States of America and to a lesser extent Greece and Turkey as mentioned above. Closely linked to exogenous factor is the “conspiracy theory” which abounds especially among the left in both communities.

Table 10

<u>E43. The interests and interventions of foreign states have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	919	85.9	540	52,0
Somewhat	109	10.2	290	27,9
Not very	20	1.9	54	5,2
Not at all	8	.7	36	3,5
DK	14	1.3	118	11,4
<i>Total</i>	<i>1070</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1038</i>	<i>100,0</i>

An overwhelming 85.9% of Greek Cypriots believe that the interests and intervention of foreign states has greatly contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots usually refer to the American and NATO interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and Cyprus due to its geo-strategic position was of interest to both superpowers during the Cold war. The C.I.A support of the Greek junta and by extension the EOKA B' in Cyprus is blamed for the subsequent partition and dislocation of people on the island (Stern 1975, Hitchens 1975, 1984). There is evidence that this anti-Makarios organization was funded by the C.I.A. and its aim was twofold: to (a) get rid of Makarios whose non-aligned foreign policy was not to the liking of neither the Greek junta nor of the State Department and (2) to facilitated any NATO-inspired solution which would be acceptable to Greece and Turkey-partition was one of the most possible options (Stern, 1975). Thus the Greek Cypriots to this day are very suspicious of any initiative for a solution of the problem undertaken by the Anglo-American: camp! They made it clear due to past experiences they would not accept any imposed solution.

A significantly lower percentage (52.0%) of Turkish Cypriots also espouse this opinion and among them the ideological left would feel more so. However, historically the Turkish Cypriots, being the minority, often welcomed foreign intervention in as far as their rights and privileges were safeguarded. For instance, they welcomed the British denial to the Greek Cypriots the right to self-determination as were against the struggle for “enosis” led by the majority of the population. They also welcomed the Turkish intervention in 1974 and lately (April 24, 2004) in a referendum voted for the “Annan Plan”. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot leadership welcomed the recent American and European support to alleviate their international isolation and help improve their socio-economic condition. The Greek Cypriot leadership worry about these foreign initiatives in case they lead to recognition of a separate state. Thus not all “outside interventions” carry the same “conspiracy” meaning for both communities. This needs to be understood especially by the Greek Cypriots who generally view the other side in a single, homogeneous lens and the findings point to this direction..

Social-Psychological-Cultural Factors

In the Conflict Resolution literature the social psychological factors, such as prejudice, cultural differences, (mis)perceptions, (mis)communication, mistrust, stereotypes, belief systems, selective memories, historical grievances as well as

violation of basic human needs have to be addressed and taken into account as part of the peace process. When these factors are mobilized we see that one group ascribes to members of the other group homogeneous traits and negative stereotypes. In the Cyprus case this aspect of the problem has been underplayed due to the over-emphasis put on the exogenous factors. Conflict Resolution views the societal, more subjective factors as important as the macro-level, objective ones. We study both in this research..

The Greek and Turkish Cypriots have had a history of living together on the island in mixed villages and towns as well as a history of conflict and separation when during the colonial period the ethnic differences were being politicized giving rise to ethno-centicism and nationalism (Attalides 1979, Pollis 1976). By looking at the social psychological factors we broaden the goal of peace and negotiations to include attitudinal and structural changes which aim to reframe the conflictual relationships to one of cooperation and mutual respect and acceptance.

Table 11

G/Cypriots

T/Cypriots

<u>E43. The ethnic-religious-cultural differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have contributed to the ...</u>	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	300	28.0	338	32.5
Somewhat	365	34.1	330	31.8
Not very	215	20.1	154	14.8
Not at all	146	13.6	132	12.7
DK	44	4.1	85	8.2
Total	<i>1070</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1039</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Interviewees in this survey as shown in the table above seem to be more skeptical about the contribution of the national/ethnic, religious and cultural differences to the Cyprus conflict. It is important to note that only 28.0% of Greek Cypriots and 32.5% of Turkish Cypriots are convinced that this was a Huntingtonian causal explanation in creating and deepening the problem. About 30% in both communities do not think ethnic differences constitute points of discord. This is a hopeful finding which challenges the Turkish Cypriot official position that Greek and Turks of Cyprus cannot live together because ‘they are ethnically different’ or because they would be

dominated by the majority. This does not mean co-existence would be as easy, as the Greek Cypriot official position often promotes.

Oftentimes analysts of the Cyprus problem support the view that these differences began to be considered as problematic or a divisive factor (and to be used in the propaganda of the respective elites) only when other substantial problems began severing coexistence on Cyprus. On the whole people do not perceive such differences as being a cause for conflict. The symbiosis of the two communities has been documented both in their daily life and in their style of living. Many of the Turkish Cypriots ate pork (although not allowed as Moslems), drank wine and married Greek women on the island as their religion allows a Turkish man to marry an infidel woman-although it forbids a Turkish woman to marry an infidel man (Kyrris 1976). As Attalides (1979) informs us it was an established social ritual-in mixed villages-it continued until 1974-to invite the whole village to a Greek wedding. "The family conducting the wedding would place a large candle in the mosque of the Turkish village. This was an open invitation"(p.76).

Despite the long geographical separation the low percentages to this question provide hope and desire for a culture of tolerance and appreciation of differences to develop in view of a future solution and as a member of the European Union. It also shows that issues of identity have become less contested.. On the contrary, economic asymmetry is still considered a more serious reason to reckon with. In bicomunal conflict resolution workshops (Hadjipavlou 2004b) this issue was brought up constantly by the Turkish Cypriots. The GNP of Greek Cypriots today is three times higher than that of the Turkish Cypriots. Let us look at the question below which refers to economic inequalities.

Table 12

<u>E43. The social and economic inequalities between G/Cs and T/Cs have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of ...</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	234	21.9	377	36,3
Somewhat	388	36.3	321	30,9
Not very	223	20.8	118	11,4
Not at all	166	15.5	122	11,8
DK	59	5.5	100	9,7
Total	<i>1070</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1038</i>	<i>100,0</i>

Another influential model of conflict analysis is the Marxist one, which emphasizes the view that social and economic inequalities constitute a cause of social and ethnic unrest which can lead to conflict. This view is supported by only 58% of Greek Cypriot interviewees and by 67% of the Turkish Cypriots. It is important to note that this numerical difference is partly a result of the fact that emphasis on this explanation has historically been given by Turkish Cypriots, who were not only a numerical minority, but also mostly less developed and less wealthy as a community than the Greek Cypriots. Often the Greek Cypriots perceive the Turkish Cypriots as “lazy” and “backward” ignoring the fact that there are both historical and political factors to explain this uneven economic development (Hadjipavlou, 2004). Historically, the Turkish Cypriots worked in administrative jobs, as military officers or in the police force especially during the Ottoman and British rule of the island. Lower class Turkish Cypriots worked as farmers or were peasants working for the rich land-owners and thus had no influence on decision-making. On the other hand the Greek Cypriots were active in commerce, trade, and had developed an entrepreneurial spirit striving for wealth, a practice many follow to this day (Constantinides, 1996).

Both in the post-independence and the post –1974 periods the Turkish Cypriots were suffering from isolation and dependency on Turkey due to political upheavals. On the contrary, the Greek Cypriots despite losing in 1974 over 70% of the economic resources in the North were able to recover and improve their economic circumstances significantly due to a variety of factors (this was known as the economic miracle) (Mavratsas, 2000, Hadjipavlou 2004b).

In conflict resolution security includes economic security, physical as well as psychological and political. There is an inter-dependence among the different areas of security. For instance, the recent European efforts to initiate measures to help the Turkish Cypriot economy and allow exports to other countries something that was impossible till now due to the economic embargo acknowledges the significance of economics as a tool in conflict reduction. The issue for a unified economy and one currency are part of the peace discourse and were thought out in the Annan Plan.

The Contact Theory and Unofficial Diplomacy

In conflict situations usually communication and trust break down and the “us and them” mentality prevails among conflicting groups. One of the causes of stereotypes

and negative perceptions of the other are often due to lack of complete information, lack of contacts and direct communication with the other who is considered the enemy. For decades the Turkish Cypriots did not exist for the Greek Cypriots, only Turkey existed. Social scientists (Allport 1956, Burton, 1990, Bar-Tal 2000, Kelman 1997) have broadened our understanding of international conflict as not only a problem concerning the diplomatic community but also the societies themselves. Thus the citizens have a role to play in the solution processes. Third-party-based interventions have grown in popularity in the last twenty years as has the range of intervention techniques and expertise (Fisher 1997, Hadjipavlou 2002). Unofficial diplomacy or citizens' contacts and conflict resolution training workshops have been used as tools in breaking down barriers to a much more complex reality than the polarized view of "us and them". Citizens from conflict societies are brought together ((in Cyprus initially with the help of a third party) to communicate their fears, concerns and grievances. The view of the other "the perceived enemy" gradually becomes more differentiated and a joint narrative emerges out of direct personal experiences that there are "people on the other side with whom we can talk and work together for a different future than the existing status quo". Thus communication and trust building ,as our survey has shown, are significant foundations in peacebuilding Mutual legitimacy of underlying security concerns, fears and pain open up spaces for alliances and coalitions to be created across ethnic lines

Table 13

<u>E43. The lack of communication between the two communities has contributed to the creation and perpetuation...</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	396	37.1	402	38,7
Somewhat	356	33.4	361	34,7
Not very	186	17.4	84	8,1
Not at all	98	9.2	110	10,6
DK	30	2.8	82	7,9
Total	<i>1066</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1039</i>	<i>100,0</i>

The table above confirms the significance of communication and of trust (the table below) in building a culture for conflict resolution. For this to happen a well-

designed processes of reconciliation would be needed. We see that a total of 70.5% of Greek Cypriots and 73.4% of Turkish Cypriots believe the lack of communication, which means having complete information as opposed to selective one as well as contacts between the two communities have been factors that contributed to the problem. For decades the two communities lived separate and journalists did not have free access to information about the other side, not even free telephone lines. Since the early 1990s thousands of people, especially the youth, have been using technology as a means to communicate. Face-to-face contacts and meetings were held amongst citizens from both communities in the “dead zone” which became in the 1990s the meeting place.

These findings, therefore, send an important message to both leaderships and third parties involved in the official efforts for a solution about people’s need for communication and the establishment of mechanisms to make this desire possible. The United Nations recognized the significance of this need and in 1993 proposed a set of confidence-building measures but both leaderships politicized their significance and rejected them. The partial opening of the Green Line in April 24, 2003, created new possibilities for reconnection, communication and people-to-people reconciliation. It is significant to note that this question is largely one of self-assessment, and largely one of self-blame for both sides, and it is interesting to observe that both communities give it high percentages of approval. Even if this statement is not seen as a primary factor (‘very’) to the problem (primacy is given to factors such as power politics and ‘involvement of foreign states’), it is still important to note that it is regarded as one important factor by such high majorities of the two communities. This is demonstrated by the thousands of people who keep crossing back and forth and new friendships are created or old friendships in mixed villages are rekindled. Unfortunately this unofficial dynamic has not been utilized politically so as to institutionalize the micro level hope and desire for reunification of the island. The lack of inspirational leadership left this dynamic to take its own course and the need for public reconciliation left unexplored..

Table 14

<u>E43. The lack of trust between the two communities has contributed to the creation and perpetuation...</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent

Very	446	41.8	630	60,6
Somewhat	354	33.1	282	27,1
Not very	153	14.3	34	3,3
Not at all	81	7.6	25	2,4
DK	34	3.2	68	6,6
Total	<i>1068</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1039</i>	<i>100,0</i>

This statement follows the same pattern as the previous one, a statement of self-assessment and criticism, with responsibility undertaken by both communities. While the Greek Cypriots agree with it by a total of 74.9%, the Turkish Cypriots also give it high percentages of approval, a combined 87.7%. Political analysts usually refer to the Zurich agreements and the 1960 Constitution as a political structure with a built-in mistrust whereby ethnic differences were institutionalized and citizenship was defined by ethnicity. A competitive relationship evolved which was reinforced by the separate school systems and the selective history teaching which socialized the young people in the fearful other thus promoting a spirit of compliance and obedience to authority. New generations grew up without knowing anything from direct experience about the other and how this other perceived them. The conflict culture deprives generations of knowing the two halves of the story and more so unable to develop a critical mind necessary quality for democratic citizenship.

The only available space for direct experiential learning about the self and other was at the inter-ethnic encounters and bicomunal festivals or activities, many of them held in the buffer zone (Hadjipavlou 2004a) These meetings were often viewed suspiciously by nationalists and the officials in both sides as undermining their own political agendas. Thus lack of any “linkage” analysis led to gaps between the leaderships and the civil society. The fact, however, that people recognize ‘mistrust’ as being a cause for the Cyprus problem, translates into self-assessment and a criticism for the leadership’s mistakes or omissions in the past and the present. The development of a strong civil society would enrich the plurality of voices and open up new possibilities for a political culture of tolerance and mutual acceptance. The institution of formal and informal education can indeed play a constructive role in this direction. The majority of the interviewees believe that formal and informal education as it is practiced today does not bring the two societies, especially the youth, closer to each

other's culture and perspectives. Let us look at Table 15 which deals with this question.

.Table 15

G/Cypriots

T/Cypriots

<u>E43. The different values and beliefs cultivated by the separate educational systems of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots contributed to the creation...</u>	G/Cypriots		T/Cypriots	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	386	36.0	329	31.7
Somewhat	354	33.0	361	34.8
Not very	155	14.5	105	10.1
Not at all	88	8.2	96	9.2
DK	89	8.3	147	14.2
Total	<i>1072</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1038</i>	<i>100.0</i>

The results to this question are somewhat similar to those presented in the tables above which assesses the role of the ethnic, religious and cultural differences in creating and perpetuating the Cyprus Problem. The emphasis here is placed on the role of education in fostering and politicizing differences and underplaying any common shared social practices between the two communities. Education has been very important factor in the history of both communities in that it is the main instrument through which the national official narratives and views are reproduced and promoted. Historically the education curriculum, the textbook and methodologies came from the respective “motherlands”. The Cypriot schools to this day celebrate the “glorious past” and national holidays of Greece and Turkey. There were never any joint celebrations. The children grow up feeling Greeks or Turks, the past and the antagonistic interpretations of events have been an important part of their socialization which often promoted the “enemy image” as it centered around nationalism and the perception of what constitutes a “bad Turk” or a “bad Greek” without much differentiation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The school becomes an open textbook. (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 1987, Spyrou 2001, Bryant 2001). In all conflict societies (Northern Ireland, South Africa, Rwanda, Bosnia –Herzegovina, Israel and Palestine, etc) the role of education and history teaching have become a focus of re-examination and re-assessment and a lot of research is carried out on peace education as a tool in

reconciliation. This study is long due in Cyprus despite sporadic attempts through bicomunal groups or among some academics.

We observe that a high percentage (69%) of Greek Cypriots who believe that the different values and perceptions/beliefs cultivated by the separate Cypriot educational systems influenced and contributed to the creation of the Cyprus problem. Another 66.5% of Turkish Cypriots also agree with this statement. In the wake of the re-assessment of the deeper roots of the Cyprus conflict, and the culture that allowed this intransigent conflict to emerge and persist. This evaluation by both communities is quite significant. This finding is a call for a critical examination of the impact of formal education in the perpetuation of the conflict. It is also an acknowledgment that the educational system and curriculum and philosophy need to change. The use of the Cypriot symbols and shared traditions need to be reinforced and legitimated.

Table 16

<u>E43.The use of national symbols (i.e.the flag, the national anthem) of the mother nation by each community have contributed to...</u>	G/Cypriots		T/Cypriots	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	343	32.1	358	34,6
Somewhat	315	29.5	306	29,6
Not very	182	17.1	108	10,4
Not at all	184	17.2	157	15,2
DK	43	4.0	106	10.3
Total	1067	100.0	1035	100,0

Although quite related to the issue touched upon by the previous question (the different values and beliefs cultivated), the assessment of this factor (the use of national symbols) does not draw percentages as high as those of the previous question. Overall, people do think that the use of “motherlands” symbols contributed to the creation and sustainability of the Cyprus conflict. A percentage of 32.1% of Greek Cypriots think that this was ‘very’ important in terms of the Cyprus problem, while another 34.6% of Turkish Cypriots says the same whereas about 30% from each community think ‘somewhat’. These can be considered as high percentages if we take into account the propaganda that still prevails in the schools, the mass media and the official narratives about the significance of Greece and Turkey in the lives of the two

communities. The Greek and Turkish flags are still everywhere and it is only in the last few years the Cyprus Republic flag became more visible. Now with the accession to the European Union the flag of EU is also to be seen in public spaces in the south and in some places in the north. It is important to note that more Turkish Cypriots than Greek Cypriots agree with the assessment on national symbols and fewer Turkish Cypriots think that it was not important. Does this indicate that the civil society in both communities are ready to embrace the Cypriot symbols in view of a solution and that the symbolic meanings of “motherlands’ symbols” i.e representing “enosis or taxim” are fading away and that a new desire of a shared Cypriotism is emerging whereby ethnic identity is replaced by civic identity? This question needs to be explored further. It also seems that “primordial attachments” do not carry the same emotional baggage as they used to and political disengagement from “motherlands” is a strong possibility.

The Leadership and the “Us and Them” dichotomy

The role of the leadership and elites in deep-rooted conflicts has been studied in the context of conflict resolution. Often the governing or non-governing elites are in competition and this makes it easy for paramilitary groups to emerge which usually are an easy target for outside manipulation and use (Nordlinger 1972). The case of Cyprus is also a case of short-sighted leadership often dependent on the “national Center” i.e. the “motherlands”. There is a great deal of mistrust and mutual suspicions amongst the elites in both sides. In view of this, how can consociational or federal structures work since this presupposes elite collaboration? Recently civil society especially in the north in mass demonstrations became critical of their leadership’s handling of the Cyprus peace talks. The Turkish Cypriots view the Greek Cypriot leadership as “not wanting a solution” whereas the Greek Cypriot view Denktash as “intransigent and serving the interests of Ankara”. This is also reflected in Table 17 below.

Table 17

<u>E43. The errors committed, on different occasions, by our (Greek/Turkish Cypriot) leadership have contributed to the creation and perpetuation...</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	645	60.2	387	37,3
Somewhat	288	26.9	288	27,7

Not very	97	9.1	96	9,2
Not at all	17	1.6	149	14,4
DK	24	2.2	118	11,4
Total	<i>1071</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1038</i>	<i>100,0</i>

A cumulative 87.1% believes that the mistakes of their (Greek Cypriot) leadership have contributed to creating and prolonging the Cyprus problem. Regardless of how one wishes to look at this, the cynicism and pessimism expressed by the Greek Cypriots on this question is striking. This cynicism may be related to several factors such as the leading perception among Greek Cypriots that theirs is the losing part in this conflict. As well as the powerful views expressed by leading sections of Greek Cypriot elites that there were many ‘lost opportunities’ (*hamenes efkeries*) regarding the solution of the problem. The image of an “indecisive and confused leadership”, unable to make policy regarding the partial opening of the Green Line and more recently the level of discussion on the Annan Plan are examples of “myopic” leadership.

The percentage of Turkish Cypriots who also espouse this statement (with regards to the Turkish Cypriot leadership) is smaller than that of the Greek Cypriots (65%). This is probably related to the fact that while Greek Cypriot leadership has been forced into numerous concessions and compromises (regarding its positions on the Cyprus problem especially since 1974-unified island, bizonal federation, loose federation, etc), the Turkish Cypriot leadership has remained relatively steadfast in its demands, and has also managed to escalate its claims in the official negotiations. Overall, the people in both communities show discontent with their leadership who they view as responsible for the protractedness of the conflict. Whenever the official talks under the auspices of the UN reached a deadlock each side blamed the other for its “intransigence” as it is shown below.

Table 18

<u>E43. The intransigence of the other side has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	888	83.1	489	47,2
Somewhat	128	12.0	325	31,3
Not very	22	2.1	71	6,8

Not at all	3	0.3	53	5,1
DK	28	2.6	99	9,6
Total	<i>1069</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1037</i>	<i>100,0</i>

An overwhelming 83.1% of Greek Cypriots thinks that the intransigence of the other side (personified perhaps in the leadership of Mr. Rauf Denktash) has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus Problem. This claim is voiced by all strata of society from political elites and academics, to the media and the average citizen.

On the other end, 47.2% of the Turkish Cypriots see that the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side, is a cause for the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem. Given the fact that many Turkish Cypriots in the opposition political camps consider their own leader as intransigent, we can understand where this significantly lower percentage stems from. This is an example of critical evaluation of one's own and the other's responsibility. The mass demonstrations in 2003 called upon their leader to "sign or resign". The Greek Cypriots expressed respect, support and admiration for the courage of the Turkish Cypriots and have not been as critical of their own side.

Table 19

<u>E43. The retreatism of our side has contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem</u>	<i>G/Cypriots</i>		<i>T/Cypriots</i>	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Very	469	44.0	153	14,7
Somewhat	360	33.8	236	22,7
Not very	150	14.1	140	13,5
Not at all	51	4.8	355	34,2
DK	36	3.4	154	14,9
Total	<i>1066</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>1038</i>	<i>100,0</i>

A 77.8% percent considers the retreatism of 'our side' to have been an important factor in creating and perpetuating the Cyprus problem. Generally, in terms of 'self-blame' all the arguments put forward in this question tend to receive a large percentage of acknowledgement or agreement among Greek Cypriots. On the Turkish Cypriot part, we see a total of 37.4% ('very' or 'somewhat') agreeing with the statement that the retreatism of the Turkish Cypriots side has influenced the development of the

Cyprus problem. This percentage seems in partial contrast to the previous statement (65%) that the errors on the part of the Turkish Cypriot leadership helped create the Cyprus problem. Together, these two questions demonstrate that the errors are not conceived so much in terms of retreatism. Nevertheless, this assessment is a fair judgment on the Turkish Cypriot part, given the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leadership has shown little compromise, in its position since 1974, insisting on a two-state solution which to the Greek Cypriots was unacceptable as was to the Turkish Cypriots the Greek Cypriot preference for a “united island”.

Concluding Remarks-Micro level Research

The root causes of the Cyprus conflict is a contested issue as much as the issue of identity. Some view it as a case of external interventions and imposed solutions, others as a case of majority and minority relations and others as part of the geopolitics of eastern Mediterranean. Yet, the findings of this research survey illustrate the complexity of the conflict and its different levels as well as an attempt to synthesize all these factors both endogenous and exogenous and how they are linked together. This is important in view of strategizing which kind of interventions to initiate and at what level so as to gradually change the conflict system so as to create a peace culture. One major observation that results from this study is the fact that a civil society is emerging in both communities and it is dissatisfied with the state of affairs as these were until 2002, namely the relationship with “motherlands” which signifies ideological and political disengagement, the role of institutions such as education and the Orthodox Church, and of their leadership. The fact that over 80% of interviewees in both communities consider nationalism to be one of the major causes of the conflict shows that nationalism is not any longer considered a viable option to meet the Cypriots’ need for either identity or security.

The most significant finding refers to the high percentages of interviewees who consider the lack of direct contacts, open communication and lack of trust as factors for the creation and perpetuation of the conflict.. This social-psychological aspect has not been referred to in the official talks nor has it become an open discussable issue in the drafting of solutions. This points to the need for the ideology of rapprochement to be institutionalized as a mechanisms so as to promote this societal need. Instead, this aspect has been left completely to individual and private initiatives such as the bicomunal conflict resolution groups or to outside third parties. The people in both

communities are ready for a new leadership which will be sensitive to their concerns, and take their diverse needs seriously and work with them on the future solution

The political elites in the Greek Cypriot community although they talk about wanting a solution they have not socialized the community in the resolution culture. In order to do so people should have been informed about the bizonal, bicomunal, federal system as this was agreed since the late 1970s. The April 24, 2004, referendum results have shown how significant is the role of leadership in mobilizing public opinion. The education system and curriculum continue to be the same despite the large expressed discontent (69% Greek Cypriots and 66% Turkish Cypriots). The revision of history textbooks has not become priority yet in the Ministry of education.

The significance of micro-level research is of major importance for a conflict society which believes in reconciliation processes. The beliefs, voices, opinions and concerns of its citizens are as significant to be known as the legal structure of a proposed solution. Processes of reconciliation in deep-rooted conflicts are complex and multifaced especially when this involves the need for mutual healing and forgiveness. Follow up qualitative and focus group research is needed to expand and enrich the findings of this survey so as to make concrete recommendations for the reconciliation tools and mechanisms to be used in Cyprus. In any conflict and post-conflict environment both the subjective and the objective factors need to be linked and studied in their relationship so as to have a more representative view of both sides' perspectives and legitimate concerns. A "linkage analysis" can help us in this for it legitimates the contributions of both formal and unofficial diplomacy in transforming a conflict culture which is a long-term project. Both the citizens and their governments need to understand this inter-dependence. I hope these findings will contribute in the direction of reconsidering the complexity of the root causes of conflicts and the possibility for a linkage approach to the solution in this case, of the Cyprus conflict. The European Union constitutes today a new possibility for this multi-level entries into creating a peace and reconciliation system in which trust, contacts, communication and dialogue will prevail. In the end the best assurance to security is the "disarmament of minds" which is indeed a long-term process.

¹ In the South we collaborated with a private college, the Intercollege in Nicosia, whose director for academic affairs is a member of the Peace Center. During the first phase of the project my colleagues from the University of Cyprus were involved in the formulation of the questionnaire. In the

implementation phase we had many university students in both sides who got training to do the interviews from house to house. So apart from the Peace Center a number of other groups got involved and benefited from this unique experience. The process was as important as the product.

² This aspect was taken into consideration by the drafters of the Annan Plan, and two referenda were held, one in each community on April 24 2004. The Greek Cypriots voted 'no' to the Annan Plan by 76% to 24% who voted 'yes'. On the Turkish Cypriot side, 65% voted 'yes' to the Annan Plan, and 34% voted 'no'. A new standstill ensued, with the EU and international community expressing their disappointment.

³ It should be mentioned that in the Turkish Cypriot population sample 14% stated they were born in Turkey. Thus, if we take this 14% from the 38% total who said that the Zurich constitution did not contribute to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus problem, we are still left with 24% who do not know part of the recent history of Cyprus. This is not so surprising in view of the fact that the teaching of Cyprus' history as separate from Greece and Turkey was not part of the school curriculum until very recently.

⁴ Exit polls conducted in the Greek Cypriot community indicate that the issue of insecurity still remains very high among those who voted 'No' to the Annan Plan. According to this plan, Turkey, Greece and Great Britain still remain the guarantors of Cypriot security needs. Those who voted 'Yes' reframed the security dilemma and placed it in the framework of the European Union and the international community's commitment to help in the implementation of the plan.

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