

# The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion During the Chinese Cultural Revolution

Joel Andreas

*Johns Hopkins University*

*This article makes a case for bringing the concept of charismatic authority back into the study of social movements. Three decades ago, with the paradigmatic shift from psychological to strategic explanations, Weber's concept virtually disappeared from scholarship about collective action. Based on an investigation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, I examine the distinctive structure and capacities of charismatic mobilization. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong called on students, workers, and peasants to attack the officials of his own party. Because Mao employed both bureaucratic and charismatic methods of mobilization, this movement offers an opportunity to compare the structural characteristics of the two and evaluate their distinctive capacities. Through a case study of the most prominent Cultural Revolution rebel organization, I demonstrate that the informal structure of charismatic mobilization gave the movement a rule-breaking power that made it highly effective in undermining bureaucratic authority. I then suggest how the concepts of charismatic and bureaucratic mobilization might be used to analyze other social movements and to clarify issues in long-standing debates about the tendency of social movement organizations to become conservative.*

Delivered by Ingenta  
Johns Hopkins University  
Tue, 12 Jun 2007 14:08:45

Are social movements fated to become more conservative as they become more organized? Weber offered a cogent explanation for why many social movement organizations fol-

low this path. Modern organizations, he argued, inculcate in their members a bureaucratic orientation toward rules and organizational hierarchies; this is especially true of organizational officials, who develop a rational orientation toward the existing order, imprisoning themselves within its rules.<sup>1</sup> Elaborating on Weber's ideas, Michels ([1915] 1959) argued that organizations inherently concentrate power in the hands of officials, and even revolutionary parties abandon radical goals as their leaders accommodate themselves to the status quo and secure a comfortable place within it. These theses, concisely conveyed in Weber's famous description of bureaucracy as an "iron cage" and in Michels's "iron law of oligarchy," have long

---

Direct correspondence to Joel Andreas, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218-2687 (jandreas@jhu.edu). Research for this article was supported by Fulbright-Hays, Spencer Foundation, and Peking University fellowships, and was facilitated by the Tsinghua University Education Research Institute. I also thank the many people connected with the university who graciously told me their stories. Rogers Brubaker, Michael Mann, Shaojie Tang, Xiaoping Cong, Chaohua Wang, Paul Pickowicz, Xiaowei Zheng, Andrew Walder, Yang Su, Margaret Kuo, Steven Day, Shengqing Wu, Eileen Cheng, Elizabeth VanderVen, Peter Andreas, William Rowe, Marta Hanson, Tobie Meyer-Fong, Giovanni Arrighi, Beverly Silver, Melvin Kohn, Dingxin Zhao, Lili Wu, Jonathan Unger, Jerry Jacobs, Vincent Roscigno, Randy Hodson, and several anonymous readers gave me helpful advice and comments.

---

<sup>1</sup> A compilation of Weber's essays on bureaucracy and charisma can be found in Weber (1978). Insightful interpretations can be found in Bendix (1960) and in Gerth and Mills's (1946) introduction to their collection of Weber's works.

haunted those of us with an aversion to cages and oligarchies.

Weber's theory of bureaucracy, however, is only one element of a larger cyclical theory of revolutionary change, in which conservative organizations are never immune from radical transformation or eclipse. Charisma, of course, is the agent of upheaval in Weber's cycle. Unfortunately, charisma virtually disappeared from the study of social movements as a result of a dramatic paradigmatic shift in the 1970s. While charismatic authority played a key role in the earlier paradigm, which relied on social-psychological explanations, the new paradigm, which stressed the rational pursuit of interests, had little use for a concept so strongly associated with irrationality. Consequently, the literature spawned by the new approach almost entirely abandoned the concept of charismatic authority. Yet the absence of charisma in scholarly analysis has not prevented the regular emergence of social movements with charismatic characteristics; this is especially true of radical movements that challenge the existing order. By neglecting charisma, scholars have relinquished a valuable tool with which to analyze these movements and have lost half of a conceptual framework that might profitably be used to understand the twists and turns of all social movements.

In this article, I make a case for bringing charisma back into the study of social movements. I argue that employing the concepts of bureaucracy and charisma in tandem sheds considerable light on issues at the center of long-standing debates about the conservative tendencies of social movement organizations. I use the Chinese Cultural Revolution to illustrate this point. Before delving into the particulars of this episode, however, it is necessary to revisit the issues that led to charisma's banishment from social movements scholarship and to set forth a framework in which charisma can be integrated into the current paradigm.

## BRINGING CHARISMA BACK INTO SOCIAL MOVEMENT SCHOLARSHIP

In the social-psychological paradigm, which reigned from the 1940s through the 1960s, social movements are caused by traumatic structural changes that produce anxiety in individuals. Charisma plays a critical role in this

"structural strain" model, as it provides a link between individual anxiety and sustained collective behavior. Individuals uprooted from traditional institutional arrangements are seen as susceptible to charismatic appeals, which offer new interpretations of the world, suggest targets for the hostility generated by structural strain, and generate powerful emotional bonds between a leader and his or her followers. Talcott Parsons (1947:70–72), who helped introduce Weber's concept to the English-speaking world, outlined how charisma might be integrated into strain theories of collective behavior. Over the next three decades, the most influential general theories of collective behavior depended on charisma as an essential element (Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957), and a number of scholars produced more narrowly defined works on charismatic movements and leaders (Downton 1966; Friedland 1964; Marcus 1961; Wallace 1956).<sup>2</sup>

Many of these scholars viewed disruptive collective behavior with trepidation and attempted to diagnose conditions that caused such behavior and identify effective methods of prevention and control. Advocates of the new paradigm, in contrast, were more sympathetic with social movements, which they saw as potential agents of positive social change. While the old school saw structural disruptions as causes of stress, the new school saw these disruptions as political opportunities; while the old school attributed successful collective action to the psychological attraction of charismatic appeals, the new school attributed this success to the effectiveness of a movement's strategy and its ability to mobilize resources (Gamson 1975; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). Advocates of the new paradigm found two aspects of the charismatic depiction of social movements particularly unappealing: the portrayal of movement actors as irrational and the emphasis on the leader. Much of the previous literature depicted social movements as

<sup>2</sup> A number of scholars, often continuing to work explicitly within the structural strain paradigm, have produced more recent studies that explore the nature of charismatic movements (e.g., Madsen and Snow 1991; Rinehart 1997; Schweitzer 1984; Willner 1984), but their work has largely been done in isolation from the now dominant paradigm.

comprised of a prophet-like figure and an amorphous mass of true believers moved by emotional attachment and irrational beliefs. In the new literature, both leaders and followers were strategic actors pursuing their interests, and the focus shifted to movement organizations rather than leaders (who were now political entrepreneurs, rather than prophets). Weber's concept, therefore, held little attraction for advocates of the new paradigm, who were partial to structural explanations and keen to recover the role of the masses (who had been left out of traditional "great men" accounts of history).

Since its triumph, however, the new paradigm has gradually made room for psychological and cultural factors, some of which recall elements of the old social-psychological paradigm (although they have been shorn of the earlier structural-functional framework and pathological connotations). The original hard-nosed objectivism of the strategic actor approach has slowly softened as scholars have recognized the importance of understanding the subjective meanings that participants attach to their actions and the sources of their commitment. As a result, identity formation, the crafting of collective action frames, and other cognitive and psychological processes have been incorporated into the prevailing paradigm (Klandermans 1984; Snow 2004; Snow and Benford 1992). This has allowed scholars to consider the role of movement leaders in these processes, especially their role in promulgating new conceptions of the world that make the status quo seem unjust and the impossible seem possible (Morris 1984; Morris and Staggborg 2004).

As Melucci (1996), a leading proponent of the shift toward cultural and psychological approaches, noted, Weber assigned these tasks to charismatic leaders. Scholars in the mainstream paradigm also have suggested that charisma plays a more important role than current theoretical models admit. Morris, who argued that Martin Luther King Jr. and others converted the institutionalized charismatic authority of churches into a force for pursuing movement goals, called on social movement scholars to give more attention to charismatic leadership and the "deep cultural and emotional processes that inspire and produce collective action" (Morris 2000:450–52). Thus, renewed appreciation for psychology and culture may be paving the road for the reintroduction of Weber's

concept into the mainstream of social movement theory.

In this article, I integrate charismatic authority into the current paradigm, but not by way of the psychological road. Instead, I extend the discussion of charisma beyond social-psychology and into the realm of political strategy and mobilizing structures. While it is understandable that the social-psychological school dwelt on the psychological aspects of charisma, there is no reason that discussion of charismatic authority should be restricted to the psychological realm. Although the importance of cognitive and emotional factors in social movements cannot be denied, the concept of charismatic authority has much broader application. It is time to free the concept from the confines of social-psychology.

Charisma lost favor among practitioners of the current paradigm because of its association with irrationality, which many erroneously believe makes it incompatible with strategic action. While Weber (1978) characterized charismatic authority as irrational, his meaning was different. "Bureaucratic authority," he wrote, "is specifically rational in the sense of being bound to intellectually analyzable rules, while charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules" (p. 244). This definition does not exclude the pursuit of interests. Among Weber's examples of charismatic types, after all, were pirate chiefs and warlords, whose followers were certainly interested in worldly goods. Although many charismatic movements promote asceticism, charisma is not defined by an indifference to material or honorific interests, but rather by an aversion to routine, rule-bound economic activity and the accompanying petty calculus, which distracts from the charismatic mission (Weber 1978:1113). This leaves plenty of room for strategic action. For example, the instrumental concerns that inspire a peasant, in ordinary times, to practice economic diligence and thrift may not be altogether different from those that inspire the same peasant, in extraordinary times, to join an insurrectionary movement that promises land redistribution. In the first instance, interests are pursued by following the rules, while in the second they are pursued by breaking the rules. This is the distinction Weber drew attention to when he contrasted bureaucratic and charismatic authority. It is a critical dis-

tion, and it generates valuable concepts with which to analyze not only the goals of social movements, but also their forms of organization and mobilizing methods.

### *CHARISMATIC AND BUREAUCRATIC MOBILIZATION*

Although Weber never expressly defined his concept this way, charisma might also be defined as the ability of a leader to mobilize people without the benefits or constraints of formal organization. Bureaucratic and charismatic authority are antithetical in principal and frequently at odds in practice. Charisma, Weber emphasized, is intrinsically hostile to the institutional hierarchies, regulations, and procedures that characterize bureaucracies. Organization (with its bureaucratic offices and rules) hinders charisma, and charisma (with its contempt for offices and rules) undermines organization. Yet, pragmatic considerations inevitably bring about combinations of the two. Radical movements, in particular, require elements of both: they are inspired by a mission that challenges the legitimacy of the existing order, but they also depend on formal organizational structures and norms that facilitate cohesion and collective action.

Charismatic and bureaucratic authority coexist uneasily within social movements, and the combination is inherently unstable. The advance of bureaucracy portends the extinction of charisma, and charismatic eruptions undercut bureaucratic authority. Weber frequently returned to this theme. He pointed out that political parties often start as charismatic followings, but develop bureaucratic hierarchies based on calculable rules, technical expertise, and a rational orientation to the existing order. This development results in conflict between charismatic leaders, whose power derives from a transcendent mission, and party officials, who favor bureaucratic norms engendered by the party organization. In all types of organizations, bureaucratic routinization diminishes the power of charismatic founders and enhances the power of officials, but official power remains susceptible to new charismatic challenges. Such conflict within organizations is part of a wider cyclical pattern, in which charisma overturns existing structures and routines, only to give

way to new structures and routines (Weber 1978:252–54, 1130–56).

Weber's essays present us with two basic propositions regarding the evolution of modern social movements: 1) conservative tendencies in radical organizations typically involve the bureaucratic routinization of charisma, and 2) radical tendencies in conservative organizations typically have charismatic inspiration.<sup>3</sup>

We can also extrapolate from Weber's basic concepts two types of mobilization: charismatic and bureaucratic. Each is characterized by distinctive types of organizational norms and means of producing cohesion. In bureaucratic mobilization, cohesion is produced by a bureaucratic hierarchy of authority with formal decision-making procedures and a clear chain of command. Authority resides in offices and does not depend on the personal characteristics of the individuals who occupy these offices, and promotion is carried out through formal processes based on technical qualifications. In charismatic mobilization, cohesion is produced by a commonly accepted mission defined by charismatic individuals. There is no formal hier-

<sup>3</sup> In Weber's revolutionary cycle, charisma always plays the disruptive role, but normal routines can rely on either bureaucratic or traditional authority (or a combination of the two). To make full use of Weber's trilateral framework it would be necessary to also consider the role of tradition. I have nevertheless chosen to focus on the simpler bilateral relationship between charismatic and bureaucratic authority because such a focus allows for greater clarity of theoretical exposition. This focus is warranted on both general and specific grounds. Although traditional authority continues to be important, its role has declined as bureaucratic norms have displaced traditional norms in modern political organizations (both conservative and insurgent). In the case under consideration here, the Chinese Communist Party's bureaucratic hierarchy was, indeed, infused with traditional-type relationships, and these were reflected in the factional conflicts of the Cultural Revolution (Walder 1986). But these relationships, which had been cultivated by party officials over a long period of time, were most important in the conservative factions that defended the local party establishment. The rebels did have powerful patrons (including Mao and his disciples in the center), but these were typically new relationships that grew out of the extraordinary conditions of the Cultural Revolution, and their character was essentially charismatic.

archy of offices, but rather a charismatic hierarchy of authority, in which a central leader is surrounded by disciples chosen because of their devotion to the cause, and local leaders gather their own followers. Each of these leaders becomes an agent of the common mission, borrowing the charismatic authority of the central leader, but also generating his or her own authority. The movement is bound together by informal networks, and decision making and promotion take place without set rules and procedures.<sup>4</sup> These are, of course, only ideal types created for analytical purposes, and actual social movements combine characteristics of both. Indeed, each type might appropriately describe the mobilizing structure of a single organization at different historical moments.

In this article, I employ these two propositions and two conceptual types to help explain the origins and results of the Cultural Revolution, and I use this dramatic episode to illustrate and further elaborate these propositions and concepts.

## RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF CHARISMA IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Cultural Revolution was an unusual social movement in that Mao Zedong called on students, workers, and peasants to attack the local officials of his own party. At the time, 17 years after the 1949 Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was at the height of its power. Every school, workplace, and village was organized around a party branch, and the authority of the local party secretary was virtually beyond challenge. The rebel movement Mao called into being had little formal organization and was led by inexperienced youths. Yet within six months, with Mao's support, it completely undermined the authority of the party organization, and young rebels declared

they had seized power from party committees in schools and workplaces around the country.

Scholarship about the Cultural Revolution also experienced the paradigmatic shift that transformed the social movements field. The authors of several of the earliest studies, oriented by the then prevailing social-psychological approach, sought to identify the psychological determinants of participants' behavior (Hiniker 1977; Lifton 1968; Pye 1968; Solomon 1971). Lifton, in particular, highlighted the irrationality of participants, portraying an image of young Red Guards—"true believers" blindly devoted to Mao and prone to fanatical, violent behavior in moments of collective excitement—that fit the classic social-psychological model of charismatic movements to a tee.

Subsequent scholars, inspired by the new paradigm, insisted that Cultural Revolution activists were rationally pursuing their own interests, and they attempted to free their explanations as much as possible from the taint of charisma (Chan, Rosen, and Unger 1980; Lee 1978; Wang 1995). In his analysis of factional contention in the industrial city of Wuhan, Wang presented the most theoretically sophisticated defense of the rational orientation of Cultural Revolution activists. Determined to counter the idea that they were blindly following Mao, Wang titled his study *The Failure of Charisma*. He found that although activists considered themselves to be Mao's disciples, they interpreted his messages according to their own interests. Furthermore, even though they said they were fighting for ideological goals (and perhaps believed this themselves), their actions showed they ultimately had more instrumental concerns. Thus, in both the social-psychological and rational actor accounts of the Cultural Revolution, charisma is associated with a type of irrationality that diverts participants from pursuing their own interests. Wang's diligent effort to parse the irrational appeal of charisma from the pursuit of interests is an admirably precise expression of the misconception that is common to both the old and new paradigms: that charisma and strategic action are mutually exclusive phenomena.

Scholars who developed rational actor accounts of the Cultural Revolution were particularly determined to dispel previous accounts that portrayed activists as an undifferentiated mass. They identified differences among con-

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the organizational principles characteristic of charismatic authority, see Weber (1978:242–46, 1112–19). For a worthy effort to further elaborate these principles, see Panebianco (1988:65–67, 143–62). Both Weber and Panebianco stressed the role of the central leader and neglected the fact that movements lacking bureaucratic organization also require local leaders who gather their own charismatic followings.

tending local organizations, which they explained in terms of group interests. Individuals from disparate disadvantaged groups banded together to form “rebel” factions, which battled “conservative” factions representing privileged groups. In these accounts, Mao’s abrupt insistence that authorities desist from suppressing protests created political opportunities for the rebels, and the emergent mass organizations were constantly maneuvering to take advantage of factional struggles in the party. Although these interest group explanations of the Cultural Revolution have been criticized for ignoring political complications (Walder 2002), they have been widely accepted.

I have previously disputed specific aspects of these interest group accounts, while accepting their basic premise (Andreas 2002). Here I turn to a different problem. How can we explain the cohesion and effectiveness of the rebel movement? What convinced individuals, dispersed across a huge country and connected by only feeble organizational ties, to unite around a specific set of political objectives and to act cohesively and decisively at critical moments? How could such fledgling and loosely organized groups overturn the entrenched power of local party organizations? Neither the early social-psychological accounts nor the later rational actor accounts provide satisfactory answers to these questions. On the one hand, the authors of the social-psychological accounts were interested in participants’ motivations and the bonds that tied them to their leader and their fellow activists, but they were less concerned with the effectiveness of strategies and organizational forms. On the other hand, although the authors of the interest group accounts turned their attention to strategy and organization, their analyses of interests and political opportunities do not provide an explanation for the rebels’ cohesion and effectiveness. Individual interests can as easily divide as unite, common interests do not automatically generate collective action, and political opportunities are only a passive factor.

In this article, I develop an explanation for the rebel movement’s cohesion and effectiveness by using the concept of charisma to analyze the movement’s structure. The rebel movement was able to maintain cohesion despite its lack of formal organization because it had a charismatic hierarchy of authority. Moreover, it was

highly effective in undermining bureaucratic authority because of its lack of formal organization, which encouraged a rule-breaking spirit. It was the loose organization typical of charismatic mobilization that gave the movement its extraordinary destructive power.

### RESEARCH AGENDA AND DATA

This article examines in detail a single organization, the Jinggangshan Regiment of Tsinghua University, China’s leading school of engineering and technology. In part because of the stature of the university and its proximity to the center of power in Beijing, Jinggangshan became the most famous rebel organization in the country and its leader, a student named Kuai Dafu, came to symbolize the seditious bravado that characterized the movement. I chose to conduct a case study of a single organization to obtain a detailed ground-level understanding of the political aims and organizational characteristics of the movement. Although the prominence of Jinggangshan made it peculiar in some ways, the basic aims and organizational characteristics described below were largely shared by similar organizations across the country.<sup>5</sup>

I conducted this research as part of a larger investigation into the postrevolutionary history of Tsinghua University. Most data was collected during 20 months of field research between 1998 and 2001. Data was obtained from two main types of sources: interviews and contemporary factional publications. I interviewed 76 people who were members of the Tsinghua University community during the factional fighting of the Cultural Revolution, including students, teachers, clerical staff, workers, and school officials. Among those interviewed were leaders and members of both of the main contending factions.<sup>6</sup> I also made use of other retrospective accounts, including personal memoirs

<sup>5</sup> Song and Sun (1996) and Tang (1996) described Jinggangshan as typical of organizations in the radical camp across China.

<sup>6</sup> The interviews took place between 1998 and 2006. Most were conducted in-person and were tape recorded. Many people graciously spoke with me on multiple occasions for many hours. With the exception of Kuai Dafu, I have not used the individuals’ real names.

and official, semiofficial, and unofficial histories. Contemporary sources include newspapers, pamphlets, and fliers published by the rival university factions.

It was important not only to obtain a wide variety of perspectives, but also to compare contemporary and retrospective accounts, which have complementary strengths and weaknesses. Contemporary newspapers and fliers recorded events from a period perspective, while retrospective interviews provided access to personal experiences and interpretations. While contemporary publications were produced under the political constraints and incentives of the period, memories of past events, motivations, and ideas have undergone a conscious or unconscious metamorphosis as subsequent events and political and ideological changes (official, collective, and personal) make their imprint.

## ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Before turning to the student movement at Tsinghua University, it is necessary to explain the origins of the Cultural Revolution. The explanation advanced here, which depends heavily on previous scholarship, describes the upheaval as a product of contradictions between the charismatic and bureaucratic elements that together constituted the CCP. All revolutionary political parties must marry an ideology that requires breaking society's rules with an organizational form that requires adherence to party rules. This combination was epitomized by the Leninist party, a highly successful model adopted by Marxist revolutionaries around the world, including Chinese Marxists. Communist leaders inspired their followers with a millenarian vision, while marshalling their efforts through a highly disciplined party organization. As Schurmann showed in his classic work, *Ideology and Organization* (1968), this was a potent combination that allowed the Chinese communists to mobilize a successful insurrectionary movement, but it also harbored powerful contradictions that became especially acute after the CCP took power.

## CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN BUREAUCRATIC MOBILIZATION

The CCP, like other victorious communist parties, assumed responsibility for administering a society based on class structures it was programmatically committed to destroying. This led to a tumultuous style of governance, as it did in the early decades of the Soviet Union, punctuated by recurring state-led political movements.<sup>7</sup> These movements, including land reform, collectivization, and the Great Leap Forward, were instruments of revolution from above, used by the new regime to attack the old elite classes and tear down institutions on which their power and privileges were based. Brief periods of calm were broken by new class-leveling campaigns that violently overturned elements of the status quo, abrogating existing policies and practices, and creating new ones. These movements invoked transcendent communist goals in an immediate fashion that made existing structures intolerable and radical change imperative. They conjured up visions of a bright communist future, concentrated popular hostility against elements of the prevailing order and existing elites (or already dispossessed and disenfranchised elites), and radically transformed the social order. Although these campaigns were highly disruptive, their methods were essentially bureaucratic, as they relied on mobilizing a vast party organization that extended down to the basic levels of society. Orders were passed down the party's chain of command from the center to regional and local branches, which mobilized subsidiary mass organizations, activating hundreds of millions of people. Thus, even after the communists took power, the recipe that brought them to power, combining a transcendent class-leveling ideology with a bureaucratic organization, had not yet exhausted its revolutionary potential.

Political movements were always initiated by Mao, who had established for himself a position *above* party deliberations, a position Meisner (1982) likened to that of a prophet. Within the central party leadership, there was a widely recognized division of labor, in which others han-

<sup>7</sup> Tucker (1961) and Lowenthal (1970) endeavored to theoretically describe this type of revolutionary regime.

dled day-to-day administrative affairs, while Mao assumed responsibility for keeping alive the communist goal of eliminating class distinctions. The party's transcendent ideological goals and the practical demands of governance became embodied, respectively, in Mao and other party leaders. Like the war chief in a tribe where power is divided between a war chief and a peace chief, Mao's power was ascendant during moments of mass mobilization.

Several scholars have suggested that Leninist parties created political movements in which charisma was not embodied in an individual, but in the party. Lenin's "party of a new type," wrote Jowitt (1983), was conceived of as "an amalgam of bureaucratic discipline and charismatic correctness" that took the "fundamentally conflicting notions of personal heroism and organizational impersonalism and recast them in the form of an organizational hero" (p. 277). Constat (1961) suggested that victorious Leninist parties created a "charismatic bureaucracy," in which expansion of bureaucratic power became the charismatic mission. Each of these interpretations provides insights into the results of the communist combination of charisma and bureaucracy, but by emphasizing the unified product of the merger they direct our attention away from its contradictions.

Some scholars of postrevolutionary China have taken the opposite tack, arguing that the Cultural Revolution was a product of tensions between Mao's charismatic authority and the bureaucratic authority of the party organization.<sup>8</sup> In seeking to explain Mao's motivations, some emphasized personal power, while others stressed ideological goals. These explanations are not contradictory, of course, as Mao's commitment to the communist mission was inseparably tied to his conception of his own role in achieving this mission.

The Cultural Revolution can be seen as a manifestation of tensions that were present in all

Leninist parties that came to power by means of indigenous revolutions. Starting with Lenin, communist leaders stridently denounced bureaucrats, and bureaucratic methods and attitudes, for impeding the implementation of the communist program.<sup>9</sup> In his study of postrevolutionary Cuba, Gonzalez (1974) produced an insightful analysis of this type of conflict, highlighting the friction between Fidel Castro's charismatic leadership style and the bureaucratic norms of the party organization. Castro presented this conflict in ideological terms, appealing to the people to fight for "mass methods" as opposed to administrative and technocratic methods, which he criticized as elitist and incompatible with "advancing the revolutionary process" (pp. 224–25). A communist party's transcendent mission inevitably clashed with the bureaucratic rationality of its organizational form, and this dissonance was frequently exacerbated by conflicts between the paramount leader, whose authority was tied to advancing the communist mission, and the party bureaucracy, which was charged with administering the country.<sup>10</sup> Nowhere, however, were the effects of this clash more pronounced than in China.

### *CHALLENGING BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITY*

In 1966, Mao divorced the communist class-leveling mission from the party organization and used his personal charismatic authority to turn the mission against the organization. He abandoned conventional bureaucratic methods of mobilization and instead appealed directly to students, workers, and peasants (including both party members and nonmembers), calling on them to form rebel organizations that were autonomous of party control and could, therefore, direct their fire at the party organization.

<sup>9</sup> See, for instance, Lenin ([1923] 1975).

<sup>10</sup> Although the Leninist model stressed the importance of the organization, the prominence of individual leaders—for example, V. I. Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, Josip Tito, Enver Hoxha, Fidel Castro, and Amilcar Cabral—in successful communist revolutions suggests that the role of personal charisma remained important. Tucker (1968) argued that Lenin transformed the Russian Marxist movement into a charismatic one.

<sup>8</sup> Dittmer (1987) presented this thesis in the most elaborate fashion, and Ahn (1974), Whyte (1974), and Hiniker (1978) made similar arguments. Schwartz (1968), Schapiro and Lewis (1969), Tsou (1969), Lee (1978), and Meisner (1982) highlighted similar dynamics in the conflict between Mao and the party organization, although they did not use the language of charisma versus bureaucracy.

The official rationale for the Cultural Revolution can be found in the thesis that the Soviet Union, China's model, was undergoing a process of "peaceful evolution" from socialism into a form of "state capitalism." According to Mao and a group of radical theorists associated with him, Soviet officials had become an exploiting class without fundamentally changing the social structure. Since China had closely followed the Soviet model, the Chinese social structure was also seen as harboring the seeds of exploitation, and the main danger to the communist project came not from the overthrown propertied classes or from external enemies, but rather from "new bourgeois elements" *inside* the party. To avoid peaceful evolution to state capitalism, Mao and his radical associates proclaimed, it was necessary to carry out a "continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." This revolution was to be directed against an emergent exploiting class, which they identified as "those in power in the party who are following the capitalist road," condensed to the shorthand term, "capitalist roaders." Criticism of the capitalist roaders highlighted the problem of "bureaucracy," the essential meaning of which, in the Chinese communist lexicon, was the concentration of power in the hands of officials. In 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Mao warned that party officials were becoming an incipient "bureaucratic class." "These people," he wrote, "have become or are in the process of becoming bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers." They were, he added, the "main target of the revolution" (Mao [1965] 1969).

Because Mao's target was the party organization, he could not rely on it to mobilize people to participate in this movement. Instead he went outside the party organization to directly mobilize students, workers, and peasants. During the first two months of the Cultural Revolution, there was a dramatic transition from bureaucratic to charismatic mobilization. The watershed event in this transition was Mao's recalling of work teams that had initially been dispatched by party authorities to lead the movement.

Party leaders had long employed work teams to rectify problems in local party organizations and ensure that political campaigns were implemented in the fashion intended by the center.

During Land Reform (1946 to 1952), for instance, work teams spent months supervising the implementation of the campaign in villages, making sure local communist cadres were not protecting landlords and rich peasants. Work teams were also charged with investigating cadre corruption and abuses of power, an ongoing effort that culminated in the Socialist Education Movement (1963 to 1966). Work teams temporarily took charge of villages, factories, and schools—setting aside the local party committees—and organized peasants, workers, and students to help investigate and criticize local leaders. They inspired fear among local cadres and were effective in enforcing party discipline and rooting out cadre corruption.<sup>11</sup>

In 1966, therefore, it was quite natural for party leaders to assume work teams would be the appropriate method to carry out Mao's latest initiative. This time, however, Mao was not simply seeking to discipline errant officials; he wanted to challenge the authority of the entire party organization. The work team method was ill-suited for this task because it relied on top-down methods, reinforcing the authority of the party hierarchy. The problem with previous efforts to reform the party, Mao concluded, was that they were directed from above. "In the past we waged struggles in rural areas, in factories, in the cultural field, and we carried out the Socialist Education Movement," he noted. "But all this failed to solve the problem because we did not find a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to expose our dark aspect openly, in an all-round way and from below."<sup>12</sup>

During the early months of the Cultural Revolution, Mao allowed central party authorities, led by President Liu Shaoqi, to send work teams to schools and workplaces, but he immediately undermined the authority of these teams by commissioning a series of newspaper and radio commentaries that condemned efforts to control the movement and declared that "the masses must educate themselves" and "liberate

<sup>11</sup> For accounts of work team methods during Land Reform and the Socialist Education Movement, see Hinton (1966), Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden (1991), and Chan, Madsen, and Unger (1984).

<sup>12</sup> Excerpt from a talk delivered by Mao in February 1967, cited in Lin ([1969] 1972:447).

themselves.”<sup>13</sup> This message incited confrontations between students and work teams (as well as between workers and work teams), which led to the emergence of a rebel movement that pledged loyalty to no one but Mao. This process can be observed in the dramatic events at Tsinghua University that led to the creation of the Jinggangshan Regiment.

### TRANSITION FROM BUREAUCRATIC TO CHARISMATIC MOBILIZATION

On June 8, 1966, a work team composed of several hundred party officials arrived at Tsinghua. It took charge of the school and suspended all university and department-level cadres. Tsinghua had been in turmoil since the end of May, when a small group of radical teachers at nearby Peking University publicly posted a caustic “big-character poster” denouncing the school’s leadership for practicing a “revisionist education line.” Mao had endorsed the poster, and Tsinghua students had flocked to the Peking University campus, eager to witness the ensuing controversy. Soon the Tsinghua campus was embroiled in a debate about the school’s own leadership. Classes stopped and the walls of campus buildings were covered with contending posters attacking and defending the university administration. The work team, dispatched by central party leaders, authoritatively settled the debate by condemning Tsinghua Party Secretary Jiang Nanxiang and the entire university party committee. They began mobilizing students and teachers to write big-character posters and participate in “criticism and struggle” meetings denouncing the university leadership.

Soon after the work team arrived, Kuai Dafu, a 21-year-old chemical engineering student, wrote a series of big-character posters accusing work team leaders of trying to control the student movement and protecting Jiang and other top university cadres by refusing to bring them before mass meetings. Kuai, whose parents were both members of their village party branch,

had been very active in party-led student political activities. He was head of the editorial committee at Tsinghua’s broadcasting station when he took this fateful first step on a path that would make him into the party organization’s implacable enemy. The work team, headed by Ye Lin, deputy chairman of the State Economic Commission, and populated by other distinguished members including President Liu Shaoqi’s wife, Wang Guangmei, had locked the university gates, prohibited contact between students of different departments, and required advance approval of big-character posters. In his unapproved posters, Kuai called for the expulsion of the work team from campus. “I didn’t like the work team’s methods,” Kuai told me. “The newspapers said it should be a students’ movement, but the work team wanted to control everything very closely. That’s not what Mao Zedong was urging us to do. . . . Liu Shaoqi . . . didn’t understand Mao’s thinking; he thought the universities were very chaotic, so he sent the work teams to try to control the situation. The work team . . . suppressed the students.”

On June 24, the work team convened a campuswide meeting to criticize Kuai, condemning him as a “counterrevolutionary.” An unrepentant Kuai denounced the work team, winning loud applause from perhaps half of the thousands of students crowded into and around the school’s main auditorium. A student selected by the work team to help control access to the stage ended up supporting the opposition instead: “I didn’t know who was wrong or right, but I felt . . . the work team didn’t let Kuai Dafu express himself, so I stopped . . . the work team’s people [from approaching the stage] and I helped Kuai Dafu. I felt that if it was a debate, then both sides should have the freedom to speak.”

Students and teachers, who were accustomed to the tightly controlled political environment at the university before the Cultural Revolution, were astonished by Kuai’s defiance. “At that time, you couldn’t doubt the leaders, so it became a big deal,” explained Ke Ming, a student who supported Kuai and later played an important role in the movement. “That changed during the Cultural Revolution—then you could. That was the impact of Mao Zedong thought. The extraordinary thing about Kuai Dafu was that he saw that back then, and he didn’t back down.” The campus split into two incipient fac-

<sup>13</sup> These slogans, which had frequently appeared in the press, were officially consecrated in Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ([1966] 1972).

tions, one supporting and one opposing the work team. Although the team mobilized students to criticize classmates who had supported Kuai, labeling them “Rightists” and “counterrevolutionaries,” it was never able to reimpose the kind of control that had existed before the Cultural Revolution.

In late July, Mao ordered the work teams removed from schools, and a few days later he issued what he called his first big-character poster, titled “Bombard the Headquarters.” The poster sharply denounced the methods of the work teams: “In the last fifty days or so, some leading comrades from the central down to the local levels have . . . [proceeded] from the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the noisy and spectacular Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution movement. They have stood facts on their head, juggled black and white, encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differing from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves” (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006:90).

A veteran teacher described the unprecedented and somewhat bewildering situation that members of the Tsinghua community encountered after the work team was withdrawn: “Before we had learned to obey the party committee; then after the party committee was gone, we listened to the work team because it represented the party. After the work team left, there was no more control, things were freer—if you wanted to, you could follow the students; if you didn’t want to, you didn’t have to.”

Before the work team left, it hastily appointed a Cultural Revolution Preparatory Committee, led by students whose parents were top party officials, to take charge of the movement. Mao, however, encouraged everyone to form their own “fighting groups,” and over the following weeks students, teachers, and workers at the university formed many small groups, which coalesced into two contending factions. The self-styled rebel faction condemned the recently departed work team, while their opponents, led by members of the Preparatory Committee, supported it. The underlying question was whether or not the party organization should control the student movement.

Kuai Dafu and several of his classmates established their own fighting group, which

they named Jinggangshan after the mountain stronghold in Jiangxi Province from which Mao and others launched their guerrilla strategy in 1927. Kuai, who even while he was under investigation by the work team in July had received visits from leaders close to Mao, was rewarded for his defiance with invitations to participate in Beijing-wide meetings to promote the most radical of the new student organizations. In October, Jinggangshan and its allies at other Beijing schools helped organize a huge rally to condemn the “bourgeois reactionary line” carried out by the party authorities and the work teams, and to denounce the “conservative” student organizations that had come to the party organization’s defense.

With public support from close associates of Mao, Jinggangshan soon became the dominant rebel organization at Tsinghua and by the end of the year, after the conservative faction had collapsed, it took complete charge of the campus. In the spring of 1967, however, more moderate students, increasingly dismayed by the radicalism of Kuai Dafu and other Jinggangshan leaders, organized a new coalition dedicated to defending the “good cadres” at the university. After that, students, teachers, and workers at Tsinghua coalesced into two fairly stable contending factions, the “radicals” and the “moderates.” The radicals, led by Kuai, attacked the pre-Cultural Revolution status quo and the party establishment, while the moderates defended the status quo and the party establishment.<sup>14</sup> Similar radical and moderate factions emerged in schools and workplaces across China, and conflict between these two camps gripped both Tsinghua and the country for the next 15 months.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Both factions emerged out of a split in Jinggangshan and each insisted on keeping the organization’s name; the radical faction was popularly known as the “Regiment,” and the moderate faction was known as “April 14th” (the date of its founding rally). I use “Jinggangshan” to refer to the radical faction so as not to unduly burden the reader with organizational names. Narratives by Hinton (1972), Tang (2003), and Zheng (2006) recount the twists and turns of the factional conflict at Tsinghua.

<sup>15</sup> I use the term “rebels” to refer more broadly to the antibureaucratic movement during the Cultural Revolution and “radicals” to refer more narrowly to the camp that opposed the moderates after the spring of 1967.

## THE RADICALS' MISSION

The goal of the Cultural Revolution, Jinggangshan activists declared in their newspaper, was to do away with the existing "hierarchical system, cadre privileges, the slave mentality, the overlord style of work, and the bloated bureaucracy" (*Jinggangshan*, May 13, 1967).<sup>16</sup> Bureaucratism was the radicals' main target and their solution was to implement "mass supervision" over cadres. They took up this task with relish, hauling university officials up on stages to be criticized, and sometimes cruelly humiliated, by their subordinates. The main practical issue that divided the factions at Tsinghua was the rehabilitation of university officials. The moderate faction thought that after cadres had made self-criticisms, most of them should be brought back to work; even if they had made mistakes, they argued, most cadres were basically good. Kuai and the radicals adamantly opposed the rehabilitation of all but a handful of university cadres.

The radicals directed their attacks against both individual party leaders and fundamental features of the underlying political system. They challenged the authority of the party committee and party offices, criticized the party's culture of political dependency, and denounced the system of career advancement based on political loyalty. The greatest gain of the Cultural Revolution, Jinggangshan activists declared, was "destroying the servile thinking" that had been encouraged by the party organization (*Jinggangshan*, April 5, 1967). Radical efforts to condemn the culture of political dependency were given a boost by a campaign Mao launched in the spring of 1967 to criticize Liu Shaoqi's book, *How to Be a Good Communist* ([1939] 1972), which was the principal guide for the conduct of communist cadres and required reading for those aspiring to join the party. In the book, Liu, who was both the country's president and the CCP's organization chief, stressed that party members must submit to the will of the party organization. Mao declared: "Party members in the past were isolated from the

masses because of the influence of *How to Be a Good Communist*, [they] held no independent views, and served as subservient tools of the party organs. The masses in various areas will not welcome too quick a recovery of the structure of the party" (Dittmer 1998:317).

Jinggangshan used the campaign as an opening to attack the modus operandi of Tsinghua's party organization, particularly its recruitment apparatus. They claimed that university party secretary Jiang Nanxiang, like Liu, had encouraged careerism among party members and demanded subservience in exchange for opportunities to climb up the party hierarchy. They denounced Jiang's motto, "Be obedient and productive," and claimed that he had cultivated a particularly servile group of cadres at Tsinghua. In a scathing essay published in the *Jinggangshan* newspaper, a midlevel university cadre wrote that Jiang's main criterion for selecting cadres was "obedience." The author, who described himself as a "pure Tsinghua-brand cadre," displayed a mastery of the criticism/self-criticism style required during the Cultural Revolution: "To be a good cadre, you had to obey 'Comrade Nanxiang' and the 'school party committee.' As long as you were obedient, you could become an official, you were placed in an important position, and you were deeply grateful." As a result of this kind of selection and lengthy training at the university, the author continued, Tsinghua cadres had been particularly damaged by Liu's "self-cultivation" mentality: "They always stick to convention and have a slave mentality; in their work they are only responsible to those above them, and they care more about following the regulations than about right and wrong. While they are subservient yes-men towards those above them, they exercise a bourgeois dictatorship over those below them and suppress divergent opinions" (*Jinggangshan*, April 18, 1967).

The radicals not only criticized university party officials but also enthusiastically attacked higher-level party leaders. "Those taking the capitalist road," an article in *Jinggangshan's* newspaper declared, "have captured part of the state machinery in China (and it has become capitalist state machinery)." What was required, therefore, was "a great revolution in which one class overthrows another." This was the task of the Cultural Revolution, "an explosion of the long-accumulated class conflict in China" that

<sup>16</sup> A collection of *Jinggangshan*, the daily newspaper published by the Jinggangshan Regiment at Tsinghua University between December 1966 and August 1968, has been reproduced in Zhou (1999).

was essentially the same kind of thoroughgoing political and social revolution as had taken place in 1949 (*Jinggangshan*, July 5, 1968). "Our primary target was those [party leaders] who were taking the capitalist road," Kuai Dafu told me. "We thought they were the main source of capitalist restoration. Those who had already been overthrown—the so-called old Rightists, the old intellectuals, the old Nationalist Party—they were not the main problem. The danger of restoration came from within the Communist Party's own ranks, from some of its own leaders."

### *IDEOLOGY, INTERESTS, AND MOBILIZATION*

How did the radicals convince people to join them in fighting for this cause? How did they rally people to act as a cohesive and effective force? In answering these questions, social-psychological accounts have stressed ideology, while rational actor accounts have stressed interests, and in both cases paradigmatic predilections have obscured the relationship between the two. This has created different kinds of problems in each of the paradigms.

Hiniker (1978), author of one of the most sophisticated social-psychological explanations, argued that Cultural Revolution activists were motivated by the incongruence between postrevolutionary reality and communist egalitarian ideals. "Successful bureaucratization," he wrote, "engenders cognitive dissonance in those ideologically committed to charismatic leadership" (p. 535). This cognitive dissonance drove the truly committed to strive even harder to bring reality in line with their millenarian vision. Hiniker contrasted this ideological orientation with the pragmatic orientation of others, who were more concerned about material well-being than ideological goals. While the latter responded to the bureaucratic leadership style that prevailed before the Cultural Revolution, the former responded to Mao's appeal for redemption in 1966. Hiniker thus identified two types of "followers" in China: one a pragmatist and the other a true believer.

Although there was a profound difference between the type of activism fostered by Mao's call for rebellion during the Cultural Revolution and that which had been fostered by the party organization before the Cultural Revolution, the difference was not that one was inspired by

ideological and the other by instrumental goals. Instead, the difference was whether activists pursued their goals, instrumental or ideological, by following or by breaking the rules. Political activism in postrevolutionary China, whether before or during the Cultural Revolution, always involved a close connection between instrumental and ideological goals. This common feature, along with the differences between the two types of activism, can be seen by comparing the criteria used to evaluate activists during the two periods.

Before the Cultural Revolution, membership in the party and in its training and recruiting arm, the Communist Youth League, was very important in terms of career considerations, and almost all Tsinghua students eventually joined the league. To gain membership, they had to compete with other students in demonstrating their commitment to communist ideology and collectivist ethics, including a willingness to "serve the people," exemplified by hard work, selflessness, and public spirit. Shirk (1982) noted the irony in this competition: to achieve their personal ambitions, students had to prove their selflessness. Nevertheless, she did not find that her informants lacked ideological commitment or a sense of moral duty, only that these were intimately linked with their efforts to get ahead.

The process of joining *Jinggangshan* and advancing to leadership positions in the organization was much less formal, but rebel activists were also expected to exhibit commitment to communist ideology and collective spirit. The criteria rebels used to evaluate their comrades, however, were different than those used by the youth league and the party in one key respect. Because the youth league and the party were intent on selecting young people who could work effectively in an organizational hierarchy, taking direction from above and giving direction to those under their supervision, compliance with bureaucratic authority was highly prized. In contrast, rebel activists were expected to demonstrate a willingness to challenge bureaucratic authority.

Like activists in the past, Cultural Revolution rebels were keen to demonstrate their commitment to communist ideals and their selflessness, but altruism was now connected with taking risks in thought and action. This is apparent in the way a *Jinggangshan* activist described

himself and his comrades: “Those who thought creatively and had different opinions supported Jिंगgangshan. I didn’t care about the personal cost; if something was wrong—then challenge it.” Kuai Dafu, who eventually spent 17 years in prison as a result of his prominent role in the rebel movement, repeated this theme of disregard for personal well-being, adding a sense of historical drama: “We were acutely aware that [the Cultural Revolution] would probably fail and we knew we would be on the losing side and would be suppressed. . . . Most people opposed the Cultural Revolution—very few really followed Mao. . . . But we felt we were an important minority and that it was our duty to fight for his ideas. . . . We were fighting for ideals, for a new world.”

Some of Kuai’s opponents were not so convinced of his altruism. A supporter of the moderate faction described him in a more opportunistic light: “Kuai Dafu saw there was an opportunity to become somebody different. . . . When you come from a very poor background [as he did] . . . you kind of have the nature of rebelling. When you get an opportunity, those people are brave; they stand up and do something different that eventually may benefit them.” It is not easy to arbitrate between altruistic and instrumental interpretations of Cultural Revolution activists’ motivations. Kuai was certainly an ambitious young man, and it is likely that personal ambitions were involved in his eagerness to take up the rebel cause. To prove his rebel credentials, however, Kuai had to demonstrate that he was willing to make great sacrifices, even die, for the cause. Ambition and altruism were insolubly linked.

Thus, ideological *and* instrumental goals were important both before and during the Cultural Revolution. Before the Cultural Revolution, however, youth league activists weighed moral and instrumental considerations in an orderly world governed by calculable rules, while during the Cultural Revolution rebel activists weighed moral and instrumental considerations in a world of revolutionary possibilities and dire risks. Both types of activists were ambitious, but youth league activists sought to realize their goals—whether ideological or instrumental—by working within the system, while Cultural Revolution rebels sought to realize their goals by overturning the system.

By presenting Cultural Revolution rebels as true believers indifferent to material interests, Hiniker made the movement impervious to interest-based analysis. In contrast, Lee (1978), whose early analysis of factional contention during the Cultural Revolution remains one of the best of the rational actor accounts, did not believe any Cultural Revolution activists were true believers: “The mass organizations were almost exclusively concerned with narrow group interests, particularly power interests. To them, ideological and policy considerations were mere means to advance their political interests” (p. 5). The movement offered insurgent leaders a chance to gain power, Lee argued, but it also offered rewards to their followers. Individuals who suffered disadvantages under the existing order saw in the rebel movement the possibility of changing the system and improving their lot. Thus, material interests, not ideological convictions, motivated the rebels.

The problem with explanations of radical upheavals that depend so heavily on the unmediated power of interests is that individuals’ conceptions of their interests under normal circumstances are largely shaped by existing institutions and rules. As game theory suggests, rules confer interests. To conceive of practical interests that transcend existing institutions requires not only a creative imagination, but a conviction that these institutions can be overturned. Under ordinary conditions, these are not interests, but pipe dreams. The mobilizing success of a radical movement can be measured in terms of its ability to turn such impractical dreams into practical goals. Interests do, indeed, propel people to join insurrectionary movements, but these are not routine everyday interests; they are interests that can only be invoked by visions of radical change. Because pursuing this type of interest requires sacrificing everyday interests, such a pursuit becomes a mission, beyond the realm of everyday rationality. Such missions are fraught with danger and uncertainty, which is one reason they are so often given by God or by History.

Many of the disadvantaged choose not to join rebel movements, and sometimes they even join the forces of order. There are many reasons for this: individuals’ understanding of their interests might be so strongly tied to prevailing power relations that they cannot imagine interests that transcend those relations, they might

not believe the lofty promises made by rebel leaders about the new order they are fighting to bring into being, or they might not be convinced they will prevail. The Cultural Revolution was no exception—in factories and villages members of the most disadvantaged social groups fought on both sides of the barricades.

In the elite confines of Tsinghua University, it was difficult to distinguish between the radical and moderate camps in terms of their members' social backgrounds, a situation that also prevailed at other universities (Rosen 1982; Walder 2002). There were children of intellectuals, party cadres, peasants, and workers on both sides, and although a contemporary survey recorded that 63 percent of student party members and student cadres supported the moderate faction, at least 27 percent supported the radical faction (Shen 2004:115). Indeed, the radicals were led by students like Kuai, who had unblemished family histories and seemingly bright futures in the political establishment—until they joined the rebel movement. Although Kuai and his confederates had the invaluable backing of China's paramount leader, they were faced with the difficult task of convincing Tsinghua students, a highly select group virtually guaranteed comfortable and prestigious positions in the existing order, that they were interested in tearing down China's elite educational and political institutions to build a still nebulous egalitarian world.<sup>17</sup>

At Tsinghua, as elsewhere, collective action required more than the direct impetus of interests. I am not arguing that interests were not important, but rather that, as Snow (2004) put it, "interpretative processes matter" (p. 383). To understand how social movements mobilize people to accomplish radical aims, it is necessary to study the dynamic relationship between interests and ideology, as well as the mobilizing structures that social movements employ. I tackle the latter problem here, employing the concept of charismatic mobilization to analyze the structure of the radical faction during the Cultural Revolution. Charismatic mobilization is particularly dependent on ideology because this type of movement, which lacks strong orga-

nizational forms, is held together largely by commitment to a common mission, and the capacity for coordinated action is generated by a charismatic rather than a bureaucratic hierarchy of authority.

## CHARISMATIC STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATION

### *TOP AND BOTTOM VERSUS THE MIDDLE*

While most charismatic movements originate from below, the Cultural Revolution originated from the top—Mao issued his call for rebellion from the very pinnacle of the state apparatus. Although unusual, this can be understood as an instance of a recurring historical pattern described by Weber, in which the power of an elite group is weakened by the concerted action of a central ruler and social groups at lower echelons of the social hierarchy. Such concerted action can take the form of a social movement that is essentially charismatic because it relies on the personal authority of a central ruler who abandons bureaucratic or traditional hierarchies, which normally underpin his authority, and directly appeals to the populace.

In his perceptive analysis of the Cultural Revolution, Luper (1996) recognizes this pattern, which he calls the "top-and-bottom-versus-the-middle strategy of power restructuring" (p. 13). Mao at the top and his rebel followers at the bottom shared the goal of undermining the power of the officials who staffed the party offices in the middle. Moreover, Mao and the rebels depended on each other. Without the rebels, Mao's crusade against the party bureaucracy would have had little impact, and without Mao's support, the rebels could not have survived. The personality cult surrounding Mao reached its height during the Cultural Revolution. His image, associated with a red sun that conjured up divinity, was ever present and his words were imbued with infallibility. Although Mao expressed discomfort with extreme manifestations of this "individual worship" (Snow 1971:174–75), it certainly reinforced his personal authority while he was challenging the authority of the party organization. The rebels were just as dependent on Mao's infallibility, which they invoked to justify their existence and ward off recriminations by local authorities.

<sup>17</sup> For detailed analyses of the interests at stake and the factional divisions at Tsinghua, see Andreas (2002) and Tang (2003).

The dynamics of this top-and-bottom-versus-the-middle strategy were evident in Kuai Dafu's first big-character poster denouncing the work team, in which he wrote: "We will oppose anyone who opposes Mao Zedong thought, no matter how great his authority or who he is" (Kuai 1966:4). Kuai's manifesto was both an unprecedented challenge to the authority of the party hierarchy and an expression of unstinting loyalty to the party's supreme leader (or, more precisely, to the mission expressed in his thought). In fact, Kuai used his loyalty to the supreme leader as a weapon to challenge party officials.

The key difference between bureaucratic and charismatic mobilization in China was that the former entailed following the guidance of the party hierarchy, while the latter entailed following Mao's personal leadership. Mao enjoyed tremendous power and could change the course of events simply by uttering a few words. But Mao was a distant god and his words were few. Once the authority of the party hierarchy had been challenged in the summer of 1966, people gained unprecedented power to think and act independently. Ironically, the extreme concentration of power in the hands of the CCP's top leader provided an opening for people at the bottom to challenge the entrenched power of party cadres. Ke Ming, the Tsinghua student leader, described how the party hierarchy's authority was undermined: "Before the Cultural Revolution, everything came down from above, one level at a time. You had to listen to those right above you. Then suddenly Mao went around the hierarchy and told the masses that the people between him and them had problems; that they should not listen to them. . . . This was the first time we had room to think for ourselves."

This new freedom was not limited to private thoughts; individuals were encouraged and even expected to criticize university officials. A radical activist at the middle school attached to Tsinghua University compared the Cultural Revolution with the situation today: "The government [today] criticizes the Cultural Revolution for being repressive, but for many of the masses it was a rare opportunity to speak out and criticize the leaders. When else could you get up on stage and openly criticize your leaders and debate? Who would get up on stage and criticize the president of Tsinghua today?"

Tsinghua students enthusiastically took advantage of this situation, covering the campus with provocative big-character posters and engaging in vehement debates. In previous political movements, there had been debates and big-character posters, but except for a six-week period during the 1957 Party Rectification campaign, they had always been closely orchestrated by the university party organization. Now there was no omnipotent organization to oversee and arbitrate the debate. Although acceptable political expression remained sharply limited, students engaged in real debates. "The two factions at Tsinghua were not just following blindly—they thought deeply about these problems," explained student activist Ke Ming, who originally supported Kuai but later became a leader of the moderate faction. "Of course, the thinking was also very limited. They all believed in Mao, but [different groups] had different interpretations of Mao."

#### *CHARISMATIC HIERARCHY OF AUTHORITY*

Although Weber noted charismatic movements' aversion to bureaucratic rules and hierarchies, he wrote little about their organizational structure. How can a large, geographically dispersed movement act in a coordinated fashion without a bureaucratic structure? How does such a movement function at the local level, far from the central leader? The Cultural Revolution provides an instructive case because tens of millions of people throughout a huge country were involved, and the movement's antibureaucratic mission made it particularly hostile to bureaucratic organizational norms.

The organizational structure of Cultural Revolution factions bore little resemblance to the bureaucratic machinery of the party. "All organizations during the Cultural Revolution were not very formal," recounted Ke Ming. "They were not like the party, with clear membership and leadership." The discipline, regulations, procedures, and hierarchical structure of the party were replaced by much looser and more haphazard organizational norms. The cohesion of the movement depended on a hierarchy of authority, but this hierarchy had charismatic rather than bureaucratic characteristics.

To lead the movement, Mao created the Central Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRSF). As Dittmer (1987) pointed out, the

group resembled the “personal staff” of select disciples that, as Weber noted, often surround charismatic leaders. CCRSG members typically shared two characteristics: ideological commitment to Mao’s radical program and a lack of bureaucratic power in the party organization. The group was led by Mao’s personal secretary, Chen Boda, and Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. Most other members were writers who had demonstrated a devotion to Mao’s class-leveling agenda. Although the CCRSG was formally an ad hoc committee attached to the party’s political bureau, it answered to no one but Mao. It stood outside the party bureaucracy and led the attack against it.<sup>18</sup>

No formal organizational links existed between the CCRSG and the myriad local rebel organizations. The most important structural feature of the rebel movement was that it was composed of self-organized local groups. This does not mean that the movement arose spontaneously; on the contrary, it arose in response to Mao’s call. Moreover, the rise to prominence of specific local leaders and groups was in part the result of intervention by powerful individuals associated with Mao. While rebel groups depended on the support of the CCRSG, the movement was not organized from above. Local rebel leaders nominated themselves and gathered their own followers. Although they appealed to Mao and his lieutenants for recognition, no formal hierarchy of command was ever established.

The local organizations were structured like political coalitions, reflecting their ad hoc origin. Both the radical and moderate factions at Tsinghua were alliances made up of small fighting groups organized by students, teachers, and university workers. After these fighting groups affiliated with one faction or the other, they remained the basic units of the larger organizations. Membership in the fighting groups fluctuated as individuals joined and left and entire groups sometimes quit one coalition to join another.

The leadership structure of the student-led factions reflected their character as coalitions. Both Jinggangshan and its moderate rival were

led by committees that co-opted members from among leaders of the largest and most influential fighting groups that made up their ranks. The fighting groups were expected to adhere to decisions made by the leadership committees, but there was little semblance of a chain of command in either organization. With time, each faction developed a fledgling bureaucratic apparatus, with ad hoc and permanent committees assigned to develop political positions and take responsibility for aspects of the organizations’ work. Nevertheless, political activity was still largely the work of the small, fluid fighting groups that made up the larger organizations. Members of these groups discussed the issues of the day and collectively wrote big-character posters. When factional contention turned violent, each group often procured or made its own weapons.

The rival factions at Tsinghua maintained informal ties with organizations around the country. These were based largely on personal relationships established during the Great Link-Up movement in the fall and winter of 1966, when millions of students from Tsinghua and other schools traveled around the country to “link-up” with others and “exchange revolutionary experiences.” Mao insisted that local authorities welcome these rebel emissaries and provide them with free transportation, food, and lodging. These agents of rebellion went to other schools, factories, and villages, spurring the formation of local rebel groups. The Great Link-Up was designed to break the power of local party officials and make certain no party committee escaped unchallenged. Mao’s proclamations were essential to this effort, but insufficient, as local leaders proved adept at simulating compliance with Cultural Revolution directives without actually relaxing control over their subordinates. Mao encouraged what every political establishment fears most: an opposition movement extending across geographic, institutional, sectoral, and class boundaries that raises not only local and partial grievances, but focuses on the governance of the country.

During the Great Link-Up, people determined their own itineraries and Tsinghua students fanned out around the country to promote the organization of local rebel movements. Some students stayed in other provinces, where, due to the prestige of the Tsinghua Jinggangshan organization, they often played leading roles in

<sup>18</sup> For analyses of the CCRSG and its members, see Lee (1978), Dittmer (1987), and MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006).

local rebel organizations. Although these students represented themselves as emissaries from the Tsinghua organization, their ties to Beijing were informal and they operated with wide latitude.

Because Kuai and other Jinggangshan leaders enjoyed direct personal ties with members of the CCRSG, the Tsinghua organization became an important node in an amorphous radical network that extended to all corners of the country. It acted as an informal link between local organizations and the central group, relaying messages in both directions. Nevertheless, this was an unruly network. Jinggangshan leaders were particularly feisty, joining abortive campaigns against some of their powerful patrons in the CCRSG, including Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, and Zhang Chunqiao, none of whom were men to cross lightly.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the informality of these factional networks, their capacity for coordination was in some ways very impressive. The daily newspapers published by Jinggangshan and its moderate rival were distributed across China through informal activist networks. During the height of the factional contention, Jinggangshan's newspaper had a greater circulation than any other newspaper in China, with the exception of the CCP's flagship, *People's Daily* (Dittmer 1998:247).

The charismatic hierarchy of authority that held together the rebel movement was much more fluid and volatile than the party's bureaucratic hierarchy. It was not based on the "charisma of office" Weber described in his discussion of the bureaucratic routinization of charisma, but rather a charisma more true to his ideal type. Charismatic authority was diffused through the entire movement, from top to bottom. Local leaders, such as Kuai Dafu, never had Mao's celestial status, but they all nominated themselves, gathered their own followers, and established their own charismatic credentials. They shared the authority emanating from Mao's mission, but they also had to demonstrate their own seditious mettle and mobilizing ability. Moreover, this was true not only of the leaders of local factions, but also of the students, teachers, and workers who led the small fighting

groups that made up these organizations. Although Mao provided the general orientation, his followers were all qualified to interpret the mission and determine the local road forward. This amorphous structure made the rebel movement susceptible to violent schisms, but it also fostered an insubordinate temperament that gave the movement devastating force.

## "REBEL SPIRIT" AND THE IMPACT OF THE REBEL MOVEMENT

Mao's phrase, "It's right to rebel," became the motto of Cultural Revolution activists. Members of Jinggangshan took pride in their "rebel spirit"—their independent thinking and willingness to challenge authority. Kuai Dafu, who owed his leadership position to his defiance of the work team, was fond of citing the traditional insurgent maxim that was also a favorite of Mao's: "He who does not fear death by one thousand cuts dares to pull the emperor from his horse." The chaos of the Cultural Revolution promoted a type of activist who thrived in conditions of political upheaval. This was true both of Jinggangshan and the moderate faction. Even defense of the status quo fell to activists who shared with their radical adversaries a proclivity for ideological polemics, political battles, and historical drama.

The impact of the rebel movement was extraordinary. The authority of the party organization, which before the Cultural Revolution could not be challenged, was shattered. This outcome required the combined efforts of Mao at the top and rebel organizations at the bottom. Mao depended on millions of rebel activists to challenge the authority of local party organizations, and the rebels depended on Mao's personal authority to protect and legitimate their movement.

The Cultural Revolution redistributed power, benefiting the top and the bottom at the expense of the middle. On the one hand, the rebel assault on the party organization further concentrated power in the hands of Mao. Ke Ming expressed this in a cogent metaphor: "During the Cultural Revolution all power went to Mao Zedong. All the small gods were overthrown—there was only one big god. Before, the party committee secretary had been a small god; not anymore." On the other hand, the movement dispersed power at the bottom. Power passed from local

<sup>19</sup> See Tang (1996:52), Hunter (1969:230), Hinton (1972:284), and *Jinggangshan* (August 26, 1967).

party officials to fledgling mass organizations, all of which were competing for mass support. Students, workers, and peasants gained unprecedented power to exercise “mass supervision” over the officials who previously had tremendous control over their lives. The fate of individual cadres in schools, workplaces, and villages was debated at mass meetings in which the participants evaluated their self-criticisms and discussed who among them should be restored to leadership positions.

In the summer of 1968, after contention between radical and moderate factions had degenerated into increasingly violent confrontations that brought China to the brink of civil war, Mao countenanced the suppression of factional activity. The contending factions were disbanded and the party organization was gradually rebuilt.<sup>20</sup> The extraordinary authority that party officials had enjoyed before the Cultural Revolution, however, was never completely restored. Mai Qingwen, a senior official at Tsinghua, explained that rebel attacks on party cadres had permanently damaged the party’s *weixin*, a term that can be translated as prestige, popular trust, or authority. “All the leading cadres were criticized, and whether or not the criticisms were correct, the conclusion was that they were all bad,” he told me. “So the *weixin* of the party fell.”

In China today, the years before the Cultural Revolution are widely remembered as a period when the CCP enjoyed tremendous prestige and local cadres had unchallenged authority. Many people I interviewed remembered this highly effective system of political control with nostalgia, while others felt deep antipathy. Most, including Mai, were ambivalent, expressing both nostalgia and antipathy. Whatever their feelings, there was general agreement that the authority of the party organization was never the same after Mao let loose a tide of popular criticism against communist officials in 1966.

<sup>20</sup> I have previously analyzed Mao’s efforts to institutionalize the antibureaucratic program of the Cultural Revolution during the last years of his life, which included fostering a system of factional contention within the party and creating institutionalized mechanisms of “mass supervision” over cadres. See Andreas (2006).

The destructive antibureaucratic power of the Cultural Revolution was made possible by its charismatic structure. This loose structure not only had room for rebels, but it cultivated and rewarded their subversive inclinations. The “rebel spirit” celebrated by Cultural Revolution activists could not have survived long if their own organizations had been governed by formal rules and hierarchies of authority. In elaborating this explanation, I hope to have convinced readers that the concept of charisma can be employed to answer questions posed by the current social movements paradigm about the efficacy of mobilizing structures without undermining the paradigm’s theoretical premises.

## DISCUSSION

### *CHARISMA AND THE EFFICACY OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION*

In their seminal book, *Poor People’s Movements* (1977), Piven and Cloward advanced the controversial thesis that informally organized movements can be more effective than formally organized movements in accomplishing radical goals.<sup>21</sup> Echoing Weber and Michels, they argued that formal organization is inherently conservative because it concentrates power in the hands of officeholders, who tend to favor accommodation with the existing order (in terms of both methods and goals) to preserve the organization and their own positions in it. Highly structured movement organizations, therefore, often stifle the element that makes radical mass movements effective—their capacity to disrupt the status quo. In those critical and transitory moments when large numbers of people are suddenly willing to break the rules and disrupt the established order, mass collective action does not require formal membership, bylaws, or elaborate organizational hierarchies, and it is often better off without them.

This article lends support to Piven and Cloward’s thesis. The rebel movement during the Cultural Revolution was effective because of its

<sup>21</sup> Piven and Cloward (1977) stirred an ongoing debate. See, for instance, McAdam (1982), Gamson and Schmeidler (1984), Cress and Snow (1996), and Barker (2001).

amorphous organizational principles. The rebels were only able to break the entrenched power of the party organization because of their visceral antipathy toward bureaucratic authority and their enthusiasm for breaking the rules—a “rebel spirit” fostered by the loose organizational norms of charismatic mobilization. At the same time, this article addresses a concern that has long troubled Piven and Cloward’s critics: Without formal organization, how can movement participants act in a coordinated fashion? In the case of the Cultural Revolution, the rebels acted cohesively and decisively at key moments despite their lack of formal decision-making procedures and organizational hierarchies. Their cohesion was produced by a hierarchy of authority, but one that was not based on a formal chain of command. It was based, instead, on commitment to a common mission proclaimed by a charismatic leader, and charismatic authority was diffused from the top to the bottom of the movement.

Charismatic authority, I would suggest, is often a critical element in the type of informally organized radical movements to which Piven and Cloward called attention. At the height of these movements, when ordinarily quiescent people are swept up in a quest for denied rights that suddenly seem not only just but also attainable, a multitude of charismatic leaders and fledgling organizations spring forth to champion the cause. The African American movement of the 1960s, for instance, was led by many individuals with this kind of inspiration, including Elijah Muhammad, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, James Farmer, Stokely Carmichael, Gloria Richardson, Huey P. Newton, and many others. No single figure dominated the entire movement, but this is true of many charismatic movements.<sup>22</sup> The power and resiliency of the movement, Gerlach and Hine (1970) argued, was due in large part to its charismatic charac-

ter and decentralized structure. In using charisma to analyze the structure of social movements, Gerlach and Hine explored the territory this article has begun to chart. Their investigation into the effectiveness of mobilizing structures made them pioneers in the new social movements paradigm, but their interest in charisma unfortunately found little echo among their colleagues.

While Piven and Cloward’s thesis about the disruptive power of informal organization is sound, there is reason to doubt their thesis if it is rendered absolute—that *only* informally organized movements can accomplish radical goals. History is replete with examples of formally organized insurgent movements that have profoundly changed society. The Chinese communists, for example, could not have sustained decades of rural insurrection without building a disciplined party organization, and ultimately they were able to use bureaucratic methods of mobilization to overturn and fundamentally transform the existing order. Gamson (1975) and McAdam (1982) had reason to argue that even the most radical challengers must develop formal organizational structures to sustain their movements. Indeed, most movements create some bureaucratic form of coordination, and to the extent they do, they move toward bureaucratic methods of mobilization.

Both charismatic and bureaucratic mobilization can accomplish radical goals, but they each have distinct structural characteristics, which give them different types of disruptive capacities. Despite its martial name, the Jinggangshan Regiment could not have carried out the protracted rural warfare that brought the CCP to power; nor could the CCP have generated the type of rebel spirit that enabled Jinggangshan to rouse the masses against it.

The concept of charismatic mobilization is designed to capture common structural characteristics of an extremely varied set of actual social movements. Although I have used the rebel movement during the Cultural Revolution as an example, no single case can serve as a definitive template for charismatic mobilization. The Cultural Revolution can certainly be disqualified from such an assignment because of its peculiarity. The movement’s top-and-bottom-versus-the-middle strategy sets it apart from most charismatic movements, which emerge from below. Moreover, China at that

<sup>22</sup> Movements that coalesce around a central charismatic figure are often the result of one leader rising above a field of charismatic rivals. In his investigation of Melanesian cargo cults, Worsley (1974) found both centralized and decentralized movements. The common image of charismatic movements, in which everyone follows a single leader, is probably an artifact of teleological selection (because unified movements usually have greater impact).

time was governed by a revolutionary regime in which bureaucratic institutions were still infused with elements of charisma, enhancing the potential for charismatic mobilization and weakening the bureaucracy's capacity to resist.

Nevertheless, the rebel movement during the Cultural Revolution shared certain essential features with other instances of charismatic mobilization. Even when a single leader enjoys tremendous authority within such a movement, formal organization is only weakly developed and local groups are largely self-organized. Without formal organization, the movement's cohesion depends on self-nominated local leaders who embrace the paramount leader's mission and become its local interpreters. The movement is united by a common mission, rather than by formal hierarchies and organizational discipline. This type of structure, which fosters disregard for established authority, engenders the distinctive power of charismatic mobilization. If successful, a movement of this kind can effectively challenge the legitimacy of the existing order and, on this basis, mobilize huge numbers of people and generate intense commitment and energy. Although such moments are often brief, their impact can be profound.

The Cultural Revolution rebel movement provides a dramatic example of how this kind of loose, mission-driven structure facilitates the rebellious, rule-breaking power of charismatic mobilization. At the same time, the movement also manifested some of the characteristic flaws and limitations of this type of mobilization. Although the rebels were united in their determination to challenge the party organization's authority, they were hardly a unified movement. The profusion of local charismatic figures did not always facilitate cooperation, and rebels fought with other rebels, as well as with moderate defenders of the establishment. The movement was resistant to mundane notions of rationality, it tended to see the world in Manichean polarities, and it imbued its top leader with extraordinary personal powers. It was short-lived, unstable, and convulsive—more fit for destruction than construction.

The fact that charisma has unattractive features, however, is no reason to banish the concept from social movement scholarship. Its purpose is analytical, and its utility should be determined by its ability to accurately describe and predict actual phenomena, whether or not

these are entirely pleasing to the observer. Once we make charismatic mobilization a topic of serious inquiry, we can begin to analytically address the causes and consequences of its less attractive features, as well as evaluate methods of mitigation (in the same manner as many have discussed the unattractive features of bureaucracy).

### *THE CONSERVATIVE TENDENCY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE WEBERIAN CYCLE*

In the long-standing debate about why social movement organizations tend to become conservative, many scholars have begun their contributions by identifying Weber (or Michels) as the author of a theory that predicts movement bureaucratization, and have then proceeded to identify means of avoiding this fate.<sup>23</sup> For the last three decades, Weber's twin concept of charisma has been largely absent from this discussion. In this article, I have suggested that we can better understand the twists and turns of social movement organizations by using these concepts in tandem: while radical movements that take advantage of the bureaucratic efficiencies of formal organization tend to become more conservative, all bureaucratic organizations are susceptible to charismatic upheavals. In the Weberian cycle, bureaucratic structures are built only to be torn down again.<sup>24</sup>

Weber's famous "iron cage" analogy was based on the following insight: it is ultimately impossible to counter the conservative tendencies of bureaucratic organization by means of institutional arrangements because the effectiveness of such arrangements, no matter how well-intentioned and intelligently designed, is circumscribed by their innate respect for the specific rationality that underpins the existing hierarchies of authority. This thesis has long been considered pessimistic. In the long run, however, it is only pessimistic if it is combined

<sup>23</sup> For recent contributions to this discussion, see Rucht (1999), Voss and Sherman (2000), Barker (2001), and Clemens and Minkoff (2004).

<sup>24</sup> Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" is also a theory of revolutionary cycles, and, as Gouldner (1955) pointed out, it might just as well be called an "iron law of democracy."

(as Weber did in his darker moments) with a prediction that bureaucratic rationality is destined to overcome the threat of charismatic challenges once and for all. Is there persuasive evidence for such a prediction?

Despite the virtual absence of charisma from mainstream social movement scholarship for the past three decades, the world today is hardly lacking in movements that Weber would have described as charismatic. Recent events in Mexico, Bolivia, Georgia, Lebanon, Iraq, Nepal, and elsewhere continue to demonstrate the power of charismatic appeals. Some of these movements have religious inspiration, while others are adamantly atheist; some reject any association with existing states, while others have captured the commanding heights of state power; some have been created from scratch, while others have converted established organizations into vehicles for pursuing new charismatic missions; some rally the poor, while others champion a disenfranchised middle class; and some require a vow of poverty, while others mobilize their followers with promises of material rewards. What they all share is a determination to accomplish their goals by breaking the rules.

Bureaucracy and charisma are most valuable when used in tandem, not only because they define each other by contrast and are constituent elements of a single cycle, but also because they are bound together in practical combinations and by their intrinsic opposition. As I have noted, all radical movements inherently contain elements of both, and the tension between them is played out dramatically as these movements rise and fall. In China, the contradictions created by the CCP's marriage of charisma and bureaucracy ultimately gave rise to the Cultural Revolution, a charismatic challenge to bureaucratic conservatism. Such a challenge might come from the top of an organization, as it did in China, or it might come from the middle or the bottom. Martin Luther, John L. Lewis, Ruhollah Khomeini, and Hugo Chavez come to mind when thinking of individuals who launched charismatic movements from positions of authority within conservative organizations. In each case, the challengers reached back to the charismatic origins of their organizations (whether in the immediate or the distant past) to find language with which to question the legitimacy of prevailing institutional

accommodations. Charismatic challenges to conservative institutions can come from within as well as from without, and the Cultural Revolution is a prominent example of the former.

*Joel Andreas is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Johns Hopkins University. He studies class relations in China and is completing a book, Rise of the Red Engineers, that analyzes the contentious merger of old and new elites during the communist era. His current research involves changing labor relations in Chinese factories between 1949 and the present.*

## REFERENCES

- Ahn, Byung-joon. 1974. "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order." *The China Quarterly* 58:249–85.
- Andreas, Joel. 2002. "Battling Over Political and Cultural Power During the Chinese Cultural Revolution." *Theory and Society* 31:463–519.
- . 2006. "Institutionalized Rebellion: Governing Tsinghua University During the Late Years of the Chinese Cultural Revolution." *The China Journal* 55:1–28.
- Barker, Colin. 2001. "Robert Michels and the 'Cruel Game.'" Pp. 24–43 in *Leadership and Social Movements*, edited by C. Barker, A. Johnson, and M. Lavalette. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.
- Bendix, Reinhard. 1960. *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. New York: Doubleday.
- Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. [1966] 1972. "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Pp. 403–16 in *Essential Works of Chinese Communism*, 2d ed., edited by W. Chai. New York: Bantam Books.
- Chan, Anita, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger. 1984. *Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Chan, Anita, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger. 1980. "Students and Class Warfare: The Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou." *The China Quarterly* 3:397–446.
- Clemens, Elisabeth and Debra Minkoff. 2004. "Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research." Pp. 157–70 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Constas, Helen. 1961. "The U.S.S.R.—From Charismatic Sect to Bureaucratic Society." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6:282–98.
- Cress, Daniel and David Snow. 1996. "Resources, Benefactors and the Viability of Homeless SMOs." *American Sociological Review* 61:1089–1109.

- Dittmer, Lowell. 1987. *China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949–1981*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 1998. *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Downton, James. 1966. *Rebel Leadership: Commitment, Charisma, and the Revolutionary Process*. New York: Free Press.
- Friedland, William. 1964. "For a Sociological Concept of Charisma." *Social Forces* 43:18–26.
- Friedman, Edward, Paul Pickowicz, and Mark Selden. 1991. *Chinese Village, Socialist State*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Gamson, William. 1975. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Chicago, IL: Dorsey Press.
- Gamson, William and Emilie Schmeidler. 1984. "Organizing the Poor." *Theory and Society* 13:567–85.
- Gerlach, Luther and Virginia Hine. 1970. *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation*. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company.
- Gerth, Hans and C. Wright Mills. 1946. "Introduction." Pp. 3–70 in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gonzalez, Edward. 1974. *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*. Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Company.
- Gouldner, Alvin. 1955. "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy." *American Political Science Review* 49:496–507.
- Gurr, Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hiniker, Paul. 1977. *Revolutionary Ideology and Chinese Reality: Dissonance Under Mao*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- . 1978. "Alternation of Charismatic and Bureaucratic Styles of Leadership in Post-Revolutionary China." *Comparative Political Studies* 10:529–54.
- Hinton, William. 1966. *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*. New York: Vintage Books.
- . 1972. *Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Hunter, Neale. 1969. *Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Jowitt, Kenneth. 1983. "Soviet Neo-traditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime." *American Political Science Review* 35:275–97.
- Klandermans, Bert. 1984. "Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory." *American Sociological Review* 49:583–600.
- Kornhauser, William. 1959. *The Politics of Mass Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Kuai, Dafu. 1966. *Qinghua Daxue dazibao* (Tsinghua University Big-Character Posters). Beijing: Tsinghua University Jinggangshan Red Guard Propaganda Team.
- Lee, Hong Yung. 1978. *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lenin, V. I. [1923] 1975. "Better Fewer, But Better." Pp. 734–46 in *The Lenin Anthology*, edited by R. Tucker. New York: Norton and Company.
- Lifton, Robert. 1968. *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Lin, Piao. [1969] 1972. "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China." Pp. 437–77 in *Essential Works of Chinese Communism*, 2d ed., edited by W. Chai. New York: Bantam Books.
- Liu, Shao-chi. [1939] 1972. "How To Be a Good Communist." Pp. 133–51 in *Essential Works of Chinese Communism*, 2d ed., edited by W. Chai. New York: Bantam Books.
- Lowenthal, Richard. 1970. "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy." Pp. 33–116 in *Change in Communist Systems*, edited by C. Johnson. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Lupher, Mark. 1996. *Power Restructuring in China and Russia*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick and Michael Schoenhals. 2006. *Mao's Last Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Madsen, Douglas and Peter Snow. 1991. *The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Time of Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mao, Zedong. [1965] 1969. "Comment on Comrade Ch'en Cheng-jen's Report on Stay at a Selected Spot." Translated in *Current Background* 891:49.
- Marcus, John. 1961. "Transcendence and Charisma." *The Western Political Quarterly* 14:236–41.
- McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
- McCarthy, John and Mayer Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82:1212–41.
- Meisner, Maurice. 1982. *Marxism, Maoism, and Utopianism: Eight Essays*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1996. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Michels, Robert. [1915] 1959. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Translated by E. Paul and C. Paul. New York: Dover Publications.
- Morris, Aldon. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights*

- Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: The Free Press.
- . 2000. "Reflections on Social Movement Theory: Criticisms and Proposals." *Contemporary Sociology* 29:445–54.
- Morris, Aldon and Suzanne Staggenborg. 2004. "Leadership in Social Movements." Pp. 171–96 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1947. "Introduction." Pp. 3–86 in *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, edited by T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward. 1977. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Pye, Lucian. 1968. *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rinehart, James. 1997. *Revolution and the Millennium: China, Mexico, and Iran*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Rosen, Stanley. 1982. *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton)*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rucht, Dieter. 1999. "Linking Organization and Mobilization: Michels' 'Iron Law of Oligarchy' Reconsidered." *Mobilization* 4:151–70.
- Schapiro, Leonard and John Lewis. 1969. "The Roles of the Monolithic Party under the Totalitarian Leader." *The China Quarterly* 40:39–64.
- Schurmann, Franz. 1968. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. 2d ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Schwartz, Benjamin. 1968. "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution." *The China Quarterly* 35:1–17.
- Schweitzer, Arthur. 1984. *The Age of Charisma*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Shen, Ruhuai. 2004. *Qinghua Daxue wenge jishi: Yige hongweibing de zishu* (Tsinghua University Cultural Revolution Chronicle: A Red Guard's Memoir). Hong Kong: Shidai Yishu Publishing House.
- Shirk, Susan. 1982. *Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Smelser, Neil. 1962. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Snow, David. 2004. "Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields." Pp. 380–412 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Snow, David and Robert Benford. 1992. "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest." Pp. 133–55 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by A. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Snow, Edgar. 1971. *The Long Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Solomon, Richard. 1971. *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Song, Yongyi and Dajin Sun. 1996. *Wenhua da geming he ta de yiduan sichao* (Heterodox Thinking During the Cultural Revolution). Hong Kong: Tianyuan Bookhouse.
- Tang, Shaojie. 1996. "Qinghua Jinggongshan bingtuan de xingshuai" (The Rise and Fall of the Tsinghua Jinggongshan Regiment). Pp. 49–63 in *Wenhua da geming: shishi yu yanjiu* (Cultural Revolution: Facts and Analysis), edited by Q. Liu. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- . 2003. *Yi ye zhiqiu: Qinghua Daxue 1968 nian "bairi da wudou"* (An Episode of the Cultural Revolution: The 1968 "Hundred Day War" at Tsinghua University). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Tsou, Tang. 1969. "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System." *The China Quarterly* 38:63–91.
- Tucker, Robert. 1961. "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes." *American Political Science Review* 55:281–9.
- . 1968. "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership." *Daedalus* 97:731–56.
- Turner, Ralph and Lewis Killian. 1957. *Collective Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Voss, Kim and Rachel Sherman. 2000. "Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 106:303–49.
- Walder, Andrew. 1986. *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- . 2002. "Beijing Red Guard Factionalism: Social Interpretations Reconsidered." *Journal of Asian Studies* 61:437–71.
- Wallace, Anthony. 1956. "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for Their Comparative Study." *American Anthropologist* 58:264–81.
- Wang, Shaoguang. 1995. *Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Whyte, Martin. 1974. "Iron Law Versus Mass

- Democracy: Weber, Michels, and the Maoist Vision." Pp. 37–61 in *The Logic of "Maoism": Critiques and Explication*, edited by J. Hsiung. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Willner, Ann Ruth. 1984. *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Worsley, Peter. 1974. *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of Cargo Cults in Melanesia*. Rev. 2d ed. New York: Schocken Books.
- Zheng, Xiaowei. 2006. "Passion, Reflection, and Survival: Political Choices of Red Guards at Qinghua University, June 1966–July 1968." *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History*, edited by J. Esherick, P. Pickowicz, and A. Walder. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Zhou, Yuan, ed. 1999. *A New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Part 1: Newspapers*. Oakton, VA: Center for Chinese Research Materials.